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ABSTRACT
This article applies the concepts associated with agrarian political economy to re-
cent Vietnamese economic development. Differences in access to land that underpin trans-
formation in rural relations of production are documented. Differences in the technical co-
efficients of production are also demonstrated amongst farms when grouped on the basis of
size of land. The impact of these changes is demonstrated to be an impressive supply re-
sponse, which suggests that dynamic productive efficiency gains have been fostered as a
result of rural restructuring. Differences in the extent to which farm households, when
grouped on the basis of expenditure quintiles, are integrated into markets, when considered
alongside differential agrarian productivity, suggests that the benefits of rural restructuring
are being inequitably distributed. Cumulatively, processes of peasant class differentiation
appear to be underway in rural Vietnam.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last 20 years, Vietnamese agriculture has shifted from a
centrally planned economy to a market-led, state-regulated economy increasingly domi-
nated by the logic of the law of value. This process is commonly described as constituting
a ‘transition’ from ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism’. As a consequence, Vietnam is often grouped
alongside the ‘transitional economies’ of central and eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, Mongolia, China and Laos (see, for example, World Bank 1996). However, placing
Vietnam in such a grouping is deeply problematic because it fails to accommodate the
unique characteristics of specific transitions. As has been succinctly stated by two leading
Vietnam scholars, ‘the particular process of transition actually adopted, by creating capital
and processes of accumulation, will have an important influence on the nature of the re-
sulting market economy’ (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: 38).
It is insufficiently appreciated that classical political economy in general, and
marxist political economy in particular, offers an analytical framework that allows an ex-
amination of the particularities of a transition from socialism to capitalism (for an excep-
tion, see Watts, 1998). This is because it offers an approach that can explain structural
changes in the mode of production. In one of the most famous statements of historical ma-
terialism, from the Preface to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx argued that
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite rela-
tions, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appro-
priate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness…At a certain
stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into
conflict with the existing relations of production, or—this merely expresses the
same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of
which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolu-
tion…(Marx, 1998: 7)
Using this analytical framework, consideration of processes of transition between
modes of production requires an examination of two sets of fundamental issues: transfor-
mation in the relations of production; and transformation in the forces of production. The
former emphases the process under which surplus is produced, extracted, and controlled.
The latter emphasizes processes that affect the rate of technological change, the organic2
composition of capital, the volume of the surplus that is produced, and thus the rate of ac-
cumulation.
In terms of empirical analysis, the investigation of the transition between modes of
production is perhaps most fully developed in agrarian political economy. Agrarian politi-
cal economy has exhaustively investigated the transition from feudalism to capitalism in
western Europe (Brenner, 1977; Hilton, 1990), the agrarian origins of capitalism in the
United States and Japan (Byres, 1996, 1991), as well as the agrarian constraint to economic
development in late industrializing and poor economies (Brenner, 1986). This article there-
fore uses the concepts and methodologies of agrarian political economy to explore and il-
luminate the agrarian transition to capitalism in Vietnam. While this article is not the first
to attempt to use agrarian political economy to examine transition in Vietnam (see, for ex-
ample, Watts, 1998), previous efforts focus on the period up to the mid-1990s. This article
is the first to attempt to apply the concepts associated with agrarian political economy to
more recent Vietnamese economic development. The article is structured as follows. Fol-
lowing this introduction, section II critically interrogates concepts of transition. Section III
examines at length the process of agrarian transition in Vietnam since the late 1970s, and
documents the outcome of this process for agricultural production, agrarian accumulation,
and rural politics. Differences in access to land that underpin transformation in rural rela-
tions of production in Vietnam are documented. Differences in the technical coefficients of
production are also demonstrated amongst farms when grouped on the basis of size of land.
The impact of these changes is demonstrated to be an impressive supply response, which
suggests that dynamic productive efficiency gains have been fostered as a result of rural
restructuring. Differences in the extent to which farm households, when grouped on the
basis of expenditure quintiles, are integrated into markets, when considered alongside dif-
ferential agrarian productivity, suggests that the benefits of rural restructuring are being
inequitably distributed. Cumulatively, processes of peasant class differentiation appear to
be well underway in rural Vietnam. Section IV offers some conclusions.3
2. CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSITION PAST AND PRESENT
‘Transition’ is now a very widely used word in economics. However, like
‘sustainability’, the meaning attached to the word can be very difficult to pin down. Ac-
cording to the World Bank (1996: 1, 4-5)
the long-term goal of transition is…to build a thriving market economy capable of
delivering long-term growth in living standards…[S]ystemic change [is] involved:
reform must penetrate to the fundamental rules of the game, to the institutions that
shape behavior and guide organizations. This makes it a profound social transition
as well as…a passage from one mode of economic organization to a thoroughly
different one…[It] must unleash a complex process of creation, adaptation, and
destruction.
This approach appears to offer a perspective rooted in institutional and evolutionary eco-
nomics. Appearances are deceiving. In practice both the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have remained resolutely neoclassical in their approach to transi-
tion. Borrowing from the experience of structural adjustment programs in Latin America in
particular (Lavigne, 1999: 277), the two institutions have emphasized four components of
transition (IMF, 2000). The first component is liberalization, encompassing both dramatic
reductions in barriers to international trade and internal market de-regulation. This is done
in order to ensure that domestic prices are determined in national and international mar-
kets. The second component is macroeconomic stabilization, which is needed to tame the
inflation set off by liberalization. Stabilization requires strict control over the government
budget, in order to minimize deficits, severe restrictions on the growth of money and
credit, and reform of the capital account in order to stabilize the balance of payments at a
sustainable level. The third component is the restructuring of production and finance
through privatization, so that goods and services that are capable of being sold in func-
tioning national and international markets are produced. The fourth component are the le-
gal and institutional reforms necessary to redefine the role of state so that it enables mar-
kets, rather than restricts them, and the concomitant establishment of the rule of law.
Clearly, for the Bretton Woods institutions, neoliberal economic rationalism con-
tinues to structure their conceptualization of transition. However, just as the economics of
adjustment can be seriously questioned (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987; United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa, 1989; Tarp, 1993; Taylor, 1991, 1996), so too can the
‘orthodox’ economics of transition. The cut in domestic demand suggested by macroeco-
nomic stabilization can have severe consequences on growth processes, while the supply4
response that was supposed to be forthcoming from liberalization, privatization and the
compression of the state has, in many instances, been illusory (Lavigne, 1999). As a con-
sequence, many economies in transition have become caught in low growth ‘traps’. The
reason for this is clear. Too many vocal economists have offered policy advice that is
based upon trying to construct an idealized end state witnessed only in neoclassical eco-
nomics textbooks. Far, far less attention has been paid to those economists that have fo-
cused upon the distorted pattern of development currently witnessed in many economies
during the transition process. Focusing upon the current distortions of ‘actually existing
transition’ rather than the envisaged end results produce a very different analysis, and a
very different set of policy recommendations. Current distortions largely reflect the pro-
found ‘structural rigidities’ (Spoor and Visser, 2001: 3) witnessed in transitional econo-
mies. In particular, transitional economies often witness the partial absence of the complex
web of social relations and institutions necessary for the fully formed emergence of capital,
for the production of surplus value, and for the realization of exchange-value. It is not so
much that institutions must be reformed, as suggested in the quote above; rather, the social
relations necessary to foster the emergence of key institutions are incomplete, and as a
consequence the institutions do not exist. This absence is ‘often more important than the
structure of relative prices’ (Spoor and Visser, 2001: 3).
The importance of the web of social relations necessary for the capitalist mode of
production can be highlighted by the emphasis usually offered to the role and extent of the
market as an indicator of the extent of transition. For example, Fforde and de Vylder
(1996: 34) define transition as ‘the establishment of an economic system in which the typi-
cal transaction in based upon voluntary exchange between independent producers and con-
sumers’. The problem with this type of emphasis is that market exchange is predicated
upon the production of commodities for exchange (Sawyer, 1993). This in turn suggests
that understanding the process of transition requires understanding not so much the terms
and conditions governing exchange as rather the social processes that structure the produc-
tion that is necessary prior to an exchange taking place. As is stressed in marxist political
economy, the social processes that structure production can be reduced to two essential
phenomena. The first is the private ownership of productive assets and, more particularly,
an ongoing process of differentiation of asset ownership between those with large quanti-5
ties of productive assets and those with limited quantities of productive assets. The struc-
ture of asset ownership determines class location, the capacity to extract surplus, and in so
doing results in the establishment of a set of relations of production predicated upon ex-
ploitation. Moreover, asset differentiation can allow some agents to ‘regulate’ the market
(Bernstein, 1996). The second is a structural shift in dynamic productive efficiency, which
indicates an unleashing of the development of the forces of production and which thus
serves as the foundation upon which sustained accumulation is facilitated. Unleashing the
forces of production can allow capitalist enterprises to generate higher profits even in
‘regulated’ markets. This is because markets act as a coercive discipline upon capitalist
production, forcing enterprises to cut unit costs, enhance innovation and invest if they are
going to retain market share. Of course, enhancing dynamic productive efficiency is con-
tingent upon differentiated control of productive assets so that capital can utilize the domi-
nant relations of production to capture the benefits of developments in the forces of pro-
duction. Thus, while the dominance of markets in resource allocation may be a necessary
condition of transition, it is in no way a sufficient condition of successful transition. The
sufficient conditions of successful transition are a transformation in the relations of pro-
duction and an unleashing of the forces of production.
Marxist political economy was primarily developed to explain industrial econo-
mies, and the general emphasis on the articulation of relations and forces of production ap-
pears salient to transitional economies whose structure is, to a greater or lesser degree, in-
dustrial. What however of poorer agrarian transitional economies? Does the general ana-
lytical framework of marxist political economy have relevance for a poorer agrarian econ-
omy such as Vietnam? The answer is a resounding ‘yes’. Agrarian political economy offers
a guide, in the form of the insights that it has derived from the investigation of the transi-
tion from a pre-capitalist mode of production to capitalism. These insights deepen the un-
derstanding of the processes that facilitate transformations in the relations and forces of
production in a comparatively poorer agrarian economy.
In agrarian political economy the occurrence of ‘those changes in the countryside
of a poor country necessary to the overall development of capitalism’ (Byres, 1996: 27) is
defined as an ‘agrarian transition’. Byres stresses interrelated changes in three sets of social
processes in particular if an agrarian transition is to succeed: production; accumulation;6
and politics (Akram-Lodhi, 1998). Changes that may or may not affect the structural trans-
formation of petty commodity producing peasant labour into its commodified form, la-
bour-power, through both the restructuring of rural labour processes and processes of peas-
ant class differentiation clearly affect production. So too does the shift, contingent on the
commodification of labour into labour-power, from the petty commodity production typi-
cal of peasant farming to generalized commodity production, as the latter is a precondition
of the production of surplus value (Lenin, 1968). Changes in the production system can
thus both effect and reflect deeper transformations in the relations of production and the
forces of production. Moreover, changes in production affects the capacity of agriculture to
supply a net marketed surplus to meet the resource costs of industrialization, the ways by
which such a surplus can be appropriated, and the ease with which such an appropriation
may occur. Thus, changes in production, in that they effect and reflect transformations in
the relations and forces of production, clearly affect accumulation. Changes in production
and in accumulation at the same time have implications for rural politics, because the focus
of rural politics is usually production and accumulation (Akram-Lodhi, 2000a). Thus, in
terms of production, accumulation, and politics agriculture has the capacity to constrain
structural transformation and economic development by acting as a fetter upon the meta-
morphosis of the relations and forces of production. The eradication of this constraint un-
leashes agrarian transition and creates the preconditions upon which the capitalist mode of
production can become dominant in a social formation.
From the above discussion, marxist political economy offers five ‘parameters of
transition’ that can be investigated for a poorer, agrarian economy such as Vietnam. The
first parameter is the differentiation of productive assets that, in a poorer, rural economy
will mean, to a large extent, land. The second, related, parameter is the extent to which the
organization of the production process sustains the emergence of generalized commodity
production, as this is the precondition of the production of surplus value. The third pa-
rameter is a structural shift in dynamic productive efficiency, as such a shift may be in-
dicative of seismic changes in the forces of production. The fourth parameter is the process
of accumulation unleashed by these changes in the production system. The fifth parameter
is the development of rural politics that will, to a large extent, reflect and effect changes in
production and accumulation.7
Differences between poorer, agrarian transitional economies can thus be expressed
in terms of differing degrees of changes in each of the five parameters, along with the way
in which the parameters articulate with each other. As will be demonstrated in this article,
in Vietnam the differentiation of productive assets has been accompanied by a still yet to
be completed shift to generalized commodity production across a significant number of
farms. Changes in the technical coefficients of production have brought about dynamic
productive efficiency gains, but it remains to be seen whether dynamic productive effi-
ciency has improved so much as make the possibility of a structural shift plausible. Despite
this doubt, the transformation in the relations of production and the impact of such a trans-
formation on the forces of production have unleashed accumulation, in the form of a his-
torically unparalleled supply response. At the same time however these processes of rural
restructuring have dispossessed a significant number of those in the rural economy, and
has, as a result, galvanized rural politics in a way not witnessed for decades. Moreover,
these processes have been well established for more than a decade. Vietnam thus appears
to be a case of an emergent if contingent agrarian transition to capitalism, although in that
it is not yet clear whether there has been a structural shift in dynamic productive efficiency
such a conclusion must be deemed to be provisional. It is to substantiating this argument
that the article now turns.
3. AGRARIAN TRANSITION IN VIETNAM, 1975-2000
3.1 Collective agriculture and agrarian crisis, 1975-1979
Vietnam’s post-unification agrarian structure was built upon an extensive collec-
tivization campaign conducted in the north of Vietnam between 1958 and 1960 and in the
south of Vietnam between 1976 and 1978 (Que, 1998). Collectivization transformed two
very different agrarian structures. In the north, collectivization transformed colonial agri-
culture and its reliance upon ‘fragmented holdings, small-scale petty commodity produc-
tion and households increasingly compelled to sell wage labour in order to survive’ (Watts,
1998: 465). In the south, collectivization was not confronting colonial agriculture, with its
‘export oriented landlord class reproduced through tenancy and sharecropping rela-
tions…and…a large rural proletariat (Watts, 1968: 466). Rather, collectivization sought to
transform a production system that had already been changed through two agrarian re-8
forms, in 1956 and 1970. These reforms substantially reduced land concentration by re-
ducing both the amount of land in the hands of landlords and reducing the number of lan-
dless, so that the majority of farmers were classified as ‘middle peasants’ in the early
1970s (Watts, 1968: 468). Thus, ‘the state confronted two very different agrarian universes
(Watts, 1998: 470). In principal, collectivization was meant to unify these two different
structures into a coherent whole. In practice, such did not happen.
Following unification and the collectivization drives there were, by 1979, across
Vietnam, some 232 state farms that produced export crops and were responsible for 11.6
per cent of agricultural production. However, the state farm sector only accounted for 0.1
per cent of staples production (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: Table 3.3). The key economic
unit in collective agriculture was instead the co-operative, which grouped labour into produc-
tion brigades expected to collectively farm crops and animals using means of production pro-
vided by the state. The co-operative managed resource allocation decisions, production and
distribution in accordance with the material targets of the State Planning Committee. As an
overriding target, the State Planning Committee sought to promote district-level self-
sufficiency in the principal agricultural use-value, rice, a policy that, to some degree, re-
stricted the extent of commodification in the economy. Nonetheless, within co-operatives
peasants were allowed to retain small personal plots amounting to no more than 5 per cent of
the total area of the co-operative. Some of the output of these plots, along with the surplus
production of the co-operative, entered the heavily regulated public and private markets that
were allowed to operate as exchange-values. The co-operative was also responsible for the
provision of social services (Men, 1995).
Co-operatives sought to mimic the division of labour found in industry by estab-
lishing a complex list of tasks and complementary inputs needed to meet output targets,
and by establishing the basis upon which labour was remunerated. As a consequence,
members of co-operatives were entered into two different types of production brigades, in
which they were expected to work between 24 and 26 days a month and 8 hours a day
(Men, 1995: 25). The first was the basic production brigade. Often consisting of women
workers and older workers, basic production brigades performed much of the less special-
ized manual labour necessary for production to proceed. By way of contrast, specialized
production brigades (ba khoan), often consisting of male workers and young workers, per-9
formed more skilled tasks such as irrigation, fertilizer production and application, and
plant protection. Basic production brigades worked according to three contractual quotas.
The first was a production outlay contract, which stipulated the inputs available for pro-
duction. The second was a work points contract, which stipulated the work points given for
different types of jobs. The third was an output contract, which stipulated the amount of
output that was required to be produced. The production brigade would then subcontract
the quotas to smaller teams of labourers, families and households. Basic production bri-
gades that exceeded their work point and output quotas were allowed to retain between 80
and 100 per cent of the excess. However, if the brigade failed to fulfil their quota they were
still responsible for providing between 50 and 70 per cent of the deficit (Men, 1995: 29-
30). Basic production brigades were paid on the basis of the amount of time spent working.
Specialized production brigades accrued work points that paid them according to both the
quantity and the quality of the work that was performed. Notwithstanding these differ-
ences, however, incomes were fairly uniform, with payment being proportional to work
points. In some areas, incomes were paid exclusively in kind, and the rate of remuneration
was set at a minimum of 13 kilos of paddy per month and a maximum of 18 kilos of paddy
per month (Que, 1998: 21-22). In other areas, labour was paid in cash while at the same
time receiving a stipulated food quota (Men, 1995: 33). The productive structure, along
with the local autonomy afforded local leaders, allowed co-operatives to isolate themselves
from the wider economy, which in turn made it difficult to make appropriate economic de-
cisions (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: 184).
In 1979 the average size of a co-operative in the north of Vietnam was 202 hec-
tares, on which an average of 378 households lived and worked (Que, 1998). This average
however masked wide variation: in some areas, co-operatives were in excess of 1000 hec-
tares. Almost 97 per cent of rural northern Vietnamese households belonged to the 4151
co-operatives that were in existence. However, the commitment of individuals to the co-
operative agrarian structure in the north of Vietnam was, at best, weak, in large part be-
cause of lingering discontent with the organization of the production system, which per-
formed quite poorly and which was thus responsible for at best stagnant living standards
(Fforde, 1989; Beresford, 1990; van Arkadie, 1993). For example, although rice yields im-
proved in North Vietnam following the collectivization drive, yield levels failed to once10
again reach those recorded in 1958 until the early 1970s, and North Vietnam remained de-
pendent upon imports of rice right through the years of the American War (Watts, 1968:
469). Based upon interviews with farmers in the north, discontent with the organization of
the production system has been summarized by Kerkvliet (1995: 68) as resulting in ‘little
or no incentive to work diligently nor disincentive to farm poorly’. Certainly, the incentive
structure of collective agriculture tied output to brigades rather than individuals, resulted in
low prices for farm output produced in excess of the quota, offered consumer subsidies that
devalued the outcomes of collective labour, and promoted an overvalued exchange rate
that encouraged imports (Men, 1995: 39). As a consequence, work in rice production was
devalued, which in turn encouraged cultivators to shift their limited resources into either
higher return activities—thus further depressing rice output—or less controlled activities.
As a result, it is not surprising that anecdotal evidence suggests that collective agri-
culture was generating quite perverse productivity outcomes. Watts cites a study of 21 dis-
tricts that suggested a drop in productivity of between 178 and 323 kilos of paddy per crop
between 1970-74 and 1977 (Watts, 1998: 469). A widely quoted field survey of 307 co-
operatives in the Red River Delta of northern Vietnam conducted in 1979 found that the
smaller the co-operative the greater the rice yields per hectare, the income per hectare, the
value of marketed food crops per hectare and the value of an undefined ‘net surplus’ per
hectare. The data is presented in Table 1. Similarly, official sources suggested that the per-
sonal plots operated by the members of co-operatives, holdings that legally accounted for 5
per cent of the cultivated area, produced more than 60 per cent of all rural household in-
come. On the other hand, the 95 per cent of the cultivated area allocated to the co-
operatives produced just over 30 per cent of all rural household income (Men, 1995: 33).
The weaknesses of the collectives were long recognized amongst peasants and local
cadres of what is now known as the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Indeed, in North
Vietnam there had been local attempts to reform the collective system dating back to the
1960s. The structure of social control facilitated these experiments: there was a high degree
of local autonomy, and local political leaders were rarely centrally appointed (Fforde and
de Vylder, 1996: 84). Most of these attempts involved discretely devolving responsibility
for some aspect of the production process directly to farm households. Kerkvliet (1995:
69-70) documents the contracting of pig farming to households, as well as land that was11
not being used for rice production being contracted out to households that paid for the use
of the land and produced what they wanted. At their most developed, these experiments at
altering rural relations of production witnessed households being contracted to produce
rice (see Kerkvliet, 1995: 90, fn 11). Experiments were often done without official ap-
proval, a practice known as ‘sneaky contracts’ (khoan chui). However, at times, the ex-
periments received official sanction. For example, in the late 1960s the highest-ranking
Party official in what is now Phu Tho province had allowed limited family-based farming
using household contracts, until he was censured by the government and removed from his
post (Fforde and Porter, 1994; Kerkvliet, 1995: 70).
One later experiment in the effort to alter the relations of production of collective
agriculture became particularly well known. In 1977 and 1978 in Do Son district near
Haiphong household contracts were introduced by a co-operative (Kerkvliet, 1995: 70;
Men, 1995: 42; Que, 1998: 32). Under these contracts, households received land from the
co-operative for the cultivation of rice. Once the household fulfilled its quota obligations to
the co-operative, it was allowed to retain the surplus as either a use-value or an exchange-
value. The household was also encouraged to reclaim wasteland, and work this land for
themselves, retaining the entire output. The results were so impressive that in 1980 the
authorities in Haiphong instructed all agricultural co-operatives to adopt the new relations
of production, a reform that served as a prelude to countrywide reform in the 1980s.
If the support for co-operative agriculture in the north of Vietnam was much
weaker than is often supposed, following unification and the collectivization drive access
to land in southern Vietnamese agriculture did not change as much as might be thought.
According to a survey (quoted in Watts, 1998: 470) in southern Vietnam in 1981 25 per
cent of rural households were landless. Some 56 per cent of farms were ‘middle peasants’,
in control of 60 per cent of the operated area. Some 12 per cent of farms were ‘upper mid-
dle peasants’, controlling 27 per cent of the land, regularly renting out farm equipment and
machinery, and regularly hiring in labour. Some 2 per cent of farms remained as rural
capitalists, controlling 7 per cent of the land and owning more than 50 per cent of all agri-
cultural machinery and equipment and livestock. This rural differentiation, based primarily
on the control of non-land means of production, mirrored the pre-unification agrarian
structure. US-inspired land reforms in 1955 and 1956 had restricted levels of rent and set a12
ceiling on land ownership of 100 hectares. These reforms were followed by land redistri-
bution in 1970, which resulted in more than 60 per cent of farmers being classified as
‘middle peasants’ in the early 1970s (Watts, 1998: 468). In the context of what was clearly
a relatively egalitarian distribution of land, agriculture in southern Vietnam witnessed the
extensive production of exchange-value for the market. Modern seed varieties, chemical
fertilizers and modern machinery were widely used (Que, 1998: 26; Dacy, 1986), the
adoption of which was often supported by US official development assistance (ODA).
Having said that, there were productivity problems in southern agriculture, often as a con-
sequence of US ODA in fostering inappropriate technical change (Dacy, 1986: 73-77).
In this light, it is clear that attempted collectivization in southern Vietnam follow-
ing unification was not particularly successful. In 1979 in southern Vietnam there were
only 272 co-operatives, and in 1980 only 24.5 per cent of farm households belonged to a
co-operative. At the same time, these figures conceal regional variations. In the central
coastal regions, by 1980 84 per cent of agricultural households had joined co-operatives, in
which land, animals and other means of production were collectively owned and basic pro-
duction teams established to perform agricultural tasks. By way of contrast, by 1980 in the
Mekong Delta only 1.7 per cent of farm households had joined co-operatives. Moreover, it
would appear that some co-operatives in southern Vietnam listed as such in official reports
did not exist in actuality, with farmers continuing to farm their own individual holdings
under the guise of a notional ‘co-operative’ (Kerkvliet, 1995: 69; Que, 1998: 32).
The impact of the attempted collectivization in southern Vietnam on the agrarian
structure was thus, at best, limited. Where attempted collectivization did have an impact
was on farm productivity. Although attempted collectivization in the south lacked the co-
ercion experienced in the north in the late 1950s, it remained the case that efforts by the
state to force some households into co-operatives resulted in a petty commodity production
becoming increasingly squeezed. Procurement quotas were particularly resented, and
served to reinforce declines in production witnessed during the period of the American
War (Dacy, 1986: 73-4). Indeed, rice yields in southern Vietnam fell by 25 per cent be-
tween 1976 and 1980. At the same time, while farms that were not members of co-
operatives were able to hold onto their machinery and livestock they were forced to con-
tract the use of such inputs to the co-operative at administratively-determined prices that13
had a negative impact on incentives. This resulted in yet lower farm production and pro-
ductivity. As a consequence, an increasing amount of land was left fallow and many farm
households ‘retreated’ into subsistence farming predicated upon the singular production of
use-values.
In the latter half of the 1970s, when efforts were made to establish a collective
agrarian structure across Vietnam, there was a precipitous decline in per capita foodgrain
availability as real agricultural output per capita fell by 1.5 per cent per annum between
1976 and 1979. This decline is illustrated in Figure 1. This occurred despite the sharp rise
in foodgrain imports demonstrated in Figure 2. The reasons for this decline have already
been suggested. In particular, the negative consequences of perverse productivity outcomes
in co-operative agriculture were but reinforced by productivity declines in non-co-
operative agriculture in southern Vietnam. Productivity was, in large part, a function of the
incentive structure facing co-operative and non-co-operative agriculture. In particular, re-
pressed procurement prices led to a procurement crisis. Between 1976 and 1979 state pro-
curement fell from 2 million tons to 1.4 million tons, with falls of 60 per cent being experi-
enced in the Mekong Delta (Watts, 1998: fn 23). This happened because an increasing pro-
portion of output produced by farmers outside the dictates of the work brigade was mar-
keted through private ‘unorganized’ markets, as opposed to state trading companies. This
was done simply because private markets offered prices ten times that of the state sector
(Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: Figure 4.1). There was thus what Fforde and de Vylder
(1996: 129) describe as a ‘distributional tension’ between an increasingly squeezed state
and rural producers. At the same time, incentive problems were compounded by a lack of
consumer goods that could be directed into agriculture as incentive goods. Finally, the in-
efficient management of co-operatives reinforced incentive problems, which in part was a
result of a lack of trained managers. Inefficient management at least is a partial explanation
as to why in June 1978 it was reported that the average length of a collective working day
was only 4 to 5 hours (Men, 1995: 33). Households used the extra time to farm the small
plot allocated to it by the co-operative, producing both use-value and exchange-value. In-
deed, on many co-operatives households began to encroach upon collective land in order to
expand the size of their small plot, selling their surplus on the free markets that legally ex-
isted. They did this by entering into arrangements with the co-operative in which the co-14
operative would supply more land for private cultivation in exchange for the fulfillment of
production quotas (Jansen, 1998: 2). Thus, during the 1970s, there is evidence that in parts
of the country the actual amount of co-operative land used by households for their small
plots ranged from 7 to 13 per cent of the co-operative area. This proportion was well in
excess of the legal maximum of 5 per cent (Kerkvliet, 1995: 69). Moreover, households
tended to prioritize the allocation of scarce resources to their plots, which had the effect of
further enhancing their productivity (Fforde, 1989). In a sense then the failures of the co-
operatives in the late 1970s led many of their members to adopt informal responses that
further undermined the co-operatives.
While the emphasis on the incentive structure and productivity outcomes of collec-
tive agriculture may explain part of the reason why agriculture fell into crisis, it is not a
complete explanation. It is also necessary to stress that in the period between 1976 and
1980 there was an inadequate amount of investment in agriculture. In the period between
1976 and 1980 the share of agricultural investment in total state investment was 20 per
cent (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: 129). While seemingly substantial, this investment fol-
lowed a period of prolonged conflict, which necessitated the rebuilding of rural physical
infrastructure and rural production capacity in a country that was, after all, predominantly
rural. It can also be noted that some investment had to be used to offset the consequences
of a series of natural calamities in the late 1970s. It should further be stressed that some of
that which was categorized as productive investment was in fact the replacement of ma-
chinery for which depreciation funds had not been set aside for maintenance and repair,
because the incentive structure of central planning prioritized new purchases over mainte-
nance. These ‘new investments’ were thus merely replacements for existing capital stock.
Finally, much of that productive investment that did take place in agriculture—such as, for
example, in irrigation in the Red River Delta—took some time to come on stream and have
an impact on production and productivity. The consequence of inadequate investment in
agriculture was that in many parts of the country the productive capacities of the sector
deteriorated in the late 1970s. Inadequate levels of investment also meant an absence of
resources to purchase relatively newer agricultural technologies and modern inputs. In any
event, newer technologies and modern inputs had to be imported, and the US trade em-
bargo, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, and China’s invasion of the north of15
Vietnam restricted the ability of the country to import because of the large cut in foreign
aid. In so doing, these events further contributed to the agrarian crisis. Of course, the ab-
sence of the acquisition of new technologies restricted the development of economies of
scale (Beresford, 1985: 11-20).
By 1980, the food crisis demonstrated in Figure 1 had festered into an agrarian cri-
sis that threatened to become systemic. The success of local initiatives to alter the relations
of production of collective agriculture by ignoring the existing rules, colloquially called
fence breaking (pha rao), demonstrated two interrelated points. The first was that intra-
sectoral reallocations of factor inputs had the potential to increase production and produc-
tivity. There was, to use Fforde and de Vylder’s (1996) phrase, ‘plan distortions’ that re-
sulted in an under utilization of existing resources; a reduction of these distortions would
have the effect of freeing up resources for increasing production. Second, as a conse-
quence, changes in rural social relations could emerge from within the inadequacies of
collective agriculture as peasants sought to reshape the organization of production. These
reasons, along with the clear success of local initiatives, encouraged the CPV to begin a
process of rural restructuring that ultimately decollectivized agriculture. Consistent with
the understanding of transition elucidated above, decollectivization transformed the agrar-
ian structure by fundamentally reconfiguring relations of production and thus the produc-
tion process, fostering rates of agrarian accumulation unparalleled in modern Vietnamese
economic history. With these processes came peasant class differentiation and the re-
emergence of rural politics, a rural politics that had been suppressed by the government in
the aftermath of the struggle for unification. It is to these processes that the article now
turns.
3.2 The decollectivization of land in the 1980s
Appendix Table A1 documents the extensive set of changes to agrarian relations
undertaken in Vietnam since 1979. These changes cover tenurial arrangements, access to
inputs, resource allocation decisions, output marketing and taxation. They have thus fun-
damentally transformed rural relations of production, replacing central planning with state
guided, but nonetheless market-based commodity production. Of these reforms, probably16
the most important are Resolution 10 of 1988, the 1993 Land Law, and, perhaps, Resolu-
tion 6 of 1998.
The ‘first wave’ of agrarian reform took place between 1981 and 1987 (Men, 1995:
42). During this period, household contracts, which allocated land to farms based upon the
size of their adult workforce in exchange for the delivery of an output quota at a fixed price
(khoan san pham), spread throughout the country, under the aegis of Directive 100 of
1981. Directive 100 established output contracts between farmers and co-operatives. The
co-operative would supply inputs for production to proceed, and work teams would con-
tinue to be allocated for land preparation, irrigation and input distribution. However, crop
management was devolved onto the farmer. Contracted output was based upon average
production over the previous three years. This output had to be sold to the state at a fixed
price. However, any output produced in excess of the contract could be retained for con-
sumption or could be sold to private traders. Directive 100, by allowing farmers to retain
output in excess of their stipulated quota commitments, restructured incentives in order to
emphasize the outcome of the production process. By allowing households to privately
market their production in excess of the quota, Directive 100 also expanded the commodi-
fication of agriculture that had previously been largely restricted to the marketing of agri-
cultural exchange-value produced either as surplus to quota or on household plots. As a
result of these reforms, aggregate output, and more especially yields, started to play a big-
ger role in economic decision making in agriculture. However, Directive 100 did not un-
dermine the role of the co-operative or its management. The co-operative still remained
responsible for the provision of inputs, and in so doing dictated the choice of technique. It
still retained control over the choice of output. It still provided certain essential agricultural
tasks, using work teams that garnered work points. It continued to be liable for the mar-
keting of quota procured output. Indeed, the exactions of the system for farm households in
some ways increased, in that CPV cadres started demanding large proportions of grain
output to pay local taxes (Watts, 1998: 473). In this light, it is not surprising that rural la-
bour mobilization into production increased. In particular, as a result of the change in the
structure of incentives the workload of women appeared to increase (Allen, 1990).
Directive 100 did nothing to move towards market-based prices, for either inputs or
outputs. Thus, it did little to establish the law of value in rural Vietnam. Indeed, Directive17
100 was, if anything, an attempt to improve the efficiency of co-operatives (Fforde and de
Vylder, 1996: 134) and as such had very little impact on largely uncollectivized southern
agriculture. In a real sense then, following Directive 100 the dominant set of relations of
production witnessed in rural northern and central Vietnam saw co-operatives still engaged
in the hiring of labour to work land, albeit under somewhat different terms and conditions.
Watts (1998: 471) goes so far as to argue that the reform resulted in the production of
sharecroppers, as producers faced quota obligations without security of tenure or the ability
to market.
The result of Directive 100, as demonstrated in Figure 1, was an initial boost to
production, and an attendant increase in real incomes. However, once these one-off static
efficiency gains were achieved, there was another sharp drop in per capita foodgrain avail-
ability in the mid-1980s. There was growth in the livestock sector, which was predomi-
nantly family controlled, and thus peasant agriculture continued to expand. Nonetheless,
the failure of the first reform to bring about sustained growth in output and in yields was in
part already recognized by 1982, when, at the 5
th Congress of the CPV the economic inter-
ests of the family were recognized as not only legitimate but equal to the economic inter-
ests of the state and the collective. This recognition served as a precondition to the decision
to abandon collective agriculture, and this decision was the impetus behind Resolution 10.
Resolution 10 fundamentally restructured the agricultural sector by formally de-
collectivizing agriculture and in so doing reestablishing peasant family farming as the
dominant mode of rural economic organization in Vietnam. Resolution 10 restructured ag-
riculture by recognizing, for the first time, the primacy of the farm household as the basic
economic unit of the rural economy and relegating co-operatives into the role of supporting
farm households. Thus, the relations of production were restructured, and this in turn fa-
cilitated a reconfiguration of the rural labour process and hence rural production. Indeed,
one aspect of Resolution 10, a resolution that originated within the agriculture department
of the CPV, was that orders from above could not be issued to co-operatives. This ended
central planning in the rural economy, and as a result some 50 per cent of the party cadres
that depended upon the co-operatives for their position lost their jobs (Fforde and de
Vylder, 1996: 157). It is of more than passing interest to note that Truong Chinh, who
wrote on Vietnam’s ‘peasant question’ in the 1930s, who was the architect of collectiviza-18
tion in the north of Vietnam in the 1950s, and who was an opponent of the fence-breaking
experiments of the 1970s, had, by 1986, come to support the shift to peasant family farm-
ing (Langguth, 2000: 94-95; Fforde and de Vylder, 1986: 165, fn 29).
In order to carry through this restructuring, co-operatives were obliged to fully
contract out land to farm households for 15 years for annual crops (khoan muoi) and 40
years for perennial crops. Although the terms of land allocation varied across Vietnam, in
most instances land was allocated on the basis of the size of the family. As a consequence,
in a relatively short period of time a relatively egalitarian distribution of land was intro-
duced across the country as peasant family farming emerged from within the ruins of cen-
tral planning. Indeed, it has been little remarked that in establishing a peasantry based upon
a ‘modified Chayanovian (household demographic composition) principle’ (Watts, 1998:
483) across Vietnam, the state succeeded in its 1975 aim of establishing a reasonably uni-
form agrarian structure across the country. That structure, however, replicated non-co-
operative southern Vietnamese agriculture across the country, not co-operative northern
agriculture. In generalizing the agrarian structure of southern Vietnamese agriculture
across the country, Watts notes that land was often restored to its former owners, including
landlords. Some instances occurred where, as a result of land titling, some who had been
farming under the co-operative agrarian structure became landless (Watts, 1998: 471). It
was a very different outcome than that envisaged by the CPV in 1975.
With decollectivization, capital stock, working capital and other means of produc-
tion were no longer controlled by the co-operatives. Instead, co-operatives retained owner-
ship of capital stock, working capital and other means of production, but were obliged to
rent it out to farm households. Moreover, farm households were allowed to buy their own
capital stock and working capital irrespective of the supply available from the co-
operative. They could thus buy and sell animals, equipment and machinery. At the same
time, the work point system, which had been retained under Directive 100, was eliminated
and replaced by cash payments. All told, the relationship of peasants to the means of pro-
duction was fundamentally transformed by Resolution 10.
In addition, output quotas are retained, but significantly reduced, allowing farm
households to keep a minimum of 40 per cent of average output and in so doing greatly
expand the scope for the production of agricultural exchange-value. Households that did19
not meet the quota had to compensate the co-operative in cash or in kind, at the market
price. The quota was fixed for 5 years, bringing a degree of certainty to farmers that had
hitherto been lacking. Farmers also had to pay agricultural taxes equivalent to an average
of 10 per cent of annual output. Finally, and importantly, private sector food marketing
was accepted by the state. This also had the consequence of expanding the scope for the
production of exchange-value, and indeed by 1993 one survey indicated that only 1.7 per
cent of peasants were selling directly to the state (Watts, 1998: 474). This acceptance was
given greater force in 1989 when, as indicated in Appendix Table A1, quota procurement
was ended, price controls ceased, and internal and external trade were, to differing degrees,
further liberalized. The consequence of this was that, for the first time since 1980, the share
of the private, or ‘unorganized’, sector in retail trade started to increase (Fforde and de
Vylder, 1996: Figure 3.13). The liberalization of 1989 thus contributed to a further deep-
ening of the commodification of economic activity.
The 1993 Land Law built on Resolution 10 by extending land tenure to 20 years for
annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops. While households were limited to 3 hectares
per farm for annual crops in the Red River Delta and 5 hectares per farm for annual crops
in the Mekong Delta, for the first time the exchange, transfer, lease, inheritance and mort-
gaging of land use rights was permitted, thus effectively commodifying land. This deep-
ening of rural property rights was in fact a necessary response to changes on the ground,
where, following Resolution 10, a land market quickly developed in secret in much of the
country. Indeed, some evidence suggests that land transactions were common prior to 1993
(Khiem, 1996: 27), which, given high land labour ratios, particularly in the Red River
Delta, might be considered surprising. In order to facilitate the development of the land
market in the wake of the 1993 Land Law, a process began of issuing farm households
with land use certificates. While assignation of land use certificates proceeded very slowly,
by 1999 over 10 million households had received certificates for agricultural land, repre-
senting about 87 per cent of agricultural households and 78 per cent of the agricultural land
in Vietnam (ANZDEC, 2000: 25). As will be demonstrated below, the issuing of certifi-
cates generated controversy at the local level. It also fomented corruption, in that People’s
Committees were given the power to resolve disputes about land allocations and titles. Fi-
nally, the 1993 Land Law reduced agricultural land use tax from an average of 10 per cent20
of annual output to 7 per cent of annual output. Perennial crops farmed on newly reclaimed
land were exempted from tax. To offset the decline in tax rates, high rates of taxation were
imposed on land transfers (Khiem, 1996: 28).
Resolution 6 of 1998 was designed to intensify the commodification of land even
though it did not go so far as to establish an officially recognized land market in which in-
dividual property rights could be transferred. Nonetheless, it was so controversial that the
Politbureau of the CPV was unable to reach an agreement on it and the National Assembly
at first refused to pass the changes in the land law suggested by it (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 10 December 1998). Therefore, much of Resolution 6 has yet to be formally im-
plemented, although in February 2000 the state reaffirmed its commitment to its imple-
mentation (Vietnam Economic Times March 2000) and, perhaps most importantly, revi-
sions to the Land Law in 1998 did contain some of the key provisions of Resolution 6. The
reason for the controversy surrounding Resolution 6 is that it lifted the legal limitation that
restricts farm size. This restriction was enacted in order to ensure an equitable distribution
of land amongst all peasants, and thus to prevent both land accumulation and land specula-
tion. As a consequence of Resolution 6 and the 1998 Land Law, it became possible to
lease, transfer and accumulate land in excess of previous legal ceilings, depending on par-
ticular local conditions. The informal land market, particularly in the south of Vietnam, has
deepened considerably as a result of Resolution 6 and the 1998 Land Law. Indeed, one
member of the Politbureau has gone so far as to say that farmers who work the land of oth-
ers make more money than if they only work their own plots. This suggests that some
senior elements of the CPV approve of extending the role of land rental in the agricultural
sector, and indeed of the return of landlord tenant relations in agriculture (Far Eastern
Economic Review, 10 December 1998).
At the same time, Resolution 6 removes all legal restrictions on the hiring of farm
labour. Although labour hiring started to become common in rural Vietnam in the early
and mid-1990s, there had been quite stringent rules that, in theory, restricted the commodi-
fication of rural labour and the establishment of a rural labour market. These rules had
been flouted; indeed, Watts (1998: 484-5) astutely notes that formal restrictions on the land
market had the effect of promoting the informal labour market because smaller families
with high consumer-worker ratios engaged in rice production would have had to hire la-21
bour during tight peak periods. Thus, even in the mid 1990s the World Bank offered evi-
dence that 32.5 per cent of rural households hired labour. There were regional variations:
only 14.5 per cent of rural households in the Red River Delta hired labour, but 70 per cent
of rural households in the Mekong Delta hired labour. There were also wealth-based dif-
ferences in labour hiring: 30 per cent of wealthier households in the Red River Delta hired
labour, but 85 per cent of wealthier households in the Mekong Delta hired labour (Watts,
1998: fn 33). More recent evidence and field work confirms both trends (Akram-Lodhi,
2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Resolution 6 thus sweeps away restrictions that had already become
largely redundant by the mid 1990s and permits an acceleration of the use of labour-power
in the rural labour process. Thus, in addition to the deepening of the informal land market,
the state has significantly liberalized the operation of the rural labour market.
One last liberalization is worth noting for its impact on the rural economy. In 2001
the state scrapped rice export quotas and fertilizer import quotas, allowing all firms en-
gaged in the domestic trade of these commodities to enter international arrangements. This
liberalization substantially strengthened the role of market clearing prices in structuring
those resource allocation decisions necessary for the production of exchange-value. Along
with previously introduced reforms, it is possible that Resolution 6 and the ‘final’ liberali-
zation of the international trade in rice will be the act that finally establishes the law of
value in Vietnamese agriculture.
3.3 Agrarian structure in the 1990s
The previous section has demonstrated that during the 1980s and 1990s Vietnam
has witnessed a transformation in rural property rights. Peasant families fostered decollec-
tivization from below and, continuing trends witnessed in southern Vietnam prior to 1975,
established themselves as the predominant unit of rural economic organization across the
country. Watts (1998), writing about the Red River Delta in 1994, argued that the resulting
equity in the distribution of land meant that any trend towards socio-economic differentia-
tion amongst peasant family farms occurred on the basis of non-farm activities. However,
this section will demonstrate that decollectivization set the stage for changes in the agrar-
ian structure that demonstrate fundamental shifts in rural relations of production in Viet-
nam.22
Data presented in Fforde and de Vylder (1996: 189) show that in 1991 there was
clear differentiation amongst net savers in the rural economy. Thus, the poorest group in
the rural economy, constituting 65 per cent of the rural population, were net dissavers. The
richest 15 to 20 per cent of the rural population were net savers. Fforde and de Vylder note
that that this ‘suggests that over one-half of the rural population was likely to be losing
control over assets’. This suggestion has been reinforced by the findings of the Vietnam
Living Standards Surveys (VLSS) published in 1994 and 1999 (General Statistical Office
(GSO) 1994, 1999)
2. Clear evidence indicates that a stratification of landholdings is begin-
ning to emerge. This is demonstrated in Table 2, which arrays landholdings for all house-
holds with agricultural land by per capita expenditure quintiles. Of course, it must be
stressed that farms in rural Vietnam are small, and for many farmers holdings of land are
insufficient to meet the subsistence needs of the household. The average size of a farm in
the Mekong Delta is 1.2 hectares, and even this was four times the average size of a farm
in the Red River Delta (World Bank, 1998: 10). Nonetheless, in Table 2 it is clear that
holdings of land—the principal agrarian asset in Vietnam, as elsewhere in rural Asia—rise
with per capita expenditure quintiles. Moreover, closer examination of the data indicates
that unequal access to land can be witnessed not just between communities but can also be
increasingly seen within communities. For the wealthiest, holdings of annual cropland are
almost 1.4 times the area of the poorest expenditure quintile. The differences between the
wealthiest and the poorest expenditure quintiles is even more striking for perennial crop
land, with the richest quintile having holdings 6 times the size of the poorest quintile. The
figures for perennial crops are extremely important, as they suggest the capacity to shift
away from rice production and diversify into higher-value food and industrial crops capa-
ble of realizing exchange-value. Watts (1998) has noted that the most dynamic sectors of
agricultural production are non-rice crops, particularly agro-industrial crops, and the data
indicates that wealthier households have expanded the proportion of their land dedicated to
perennial crops during the 1990s. Thus, whereas the wealthiest rural households devoted
                                                
2 In 1993 and 1998 the GSO undertook two nationally representative living standards surveys, with financial
and technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. The first VLSS surveyed 4800 households.
The second VLSS surveyed 6000 households, including 4300 that had been surveyed during the first VLSS.
Thus, Vietnam has a rich data set, even though the 1998 VLSS is ‘not a true random sample of Vietnamese
households’ (Desai, 2000: i).23
15 per cent of their land to perennial crops in 1993, by 1998 this figure had risen to 37 per
cent (GSO, 1994: Table 5.1.1; GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.2). In a differentiating agriculture,
increasing the share of output accounted for by higher-value crops amongst wealthier
households promotes further asset differentiation. It should also be noted that the quality of
land held by wealthier households is improving. In 1993, some 16 per cent of land held by
the wealthiest quintile was classified as good, and 41.5 per cent of their land was irrigated.
By 1998 the former figure had risen to 21 per cent, while the proportion of land irrigated
amongst wealthier households stood at 82 per cent (GSO, 1994: Table 5.1.11; GSO, 1999:
Table 5.1.7).
It is of interest to note that the number of households in the 1998 VLSS that sold
land was 10 times the number of households that sold land in the 1993 VLSS (GSO, 1994:
Table 5.1.21; GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.10). The average price of crop land, in current Viet-
namese dong (VND), jumped from VND 11.9 million in 1993 to VND 26.1 million in
1998, a period in which, it can be noted, inflation was very low. Moreover, data on land
sales, by excluding evidence on land rented-in, probably underestimate the extent of strati-
fication of landholdings in rural Vietnam. It has already been noted that Vietnam’s infor-
mal land market appeared to be quite active in the early 1990s, despite the fact that high
land labour ratios might serve to discourage renting. This finding was substantiated in the
1998 VLSS, where it is demonstrated that 15.3 per cent of farm households rented out land
while 5.9 per cent of farm households rented in land (GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.6). Moreover,
it may well be the case that land stratification is proceeding more quickly in particular
parts of Vietnam than in others. For example, it has been suggested (Phong, 1995: 167)
that in the Plain of Reeds land concentration is the most pronounced in all of Vietnam.
Mechanisms underpinning land concentration in rural Vietnam have been explored
in a recent study of one province where the problem appears to be acute (Oxfam (GB),
1999). The study identified seven reasons why rural households had liquidated landhold-
ings. The first reason was formal sector credit, as some people that took out formal loans
for the first time found that they were unable to meet their obligations and had as a conse-
quence been forced to sell their land. The second reason was output failures, which re-
sulted in the need to sell land to repay accumulated debts. The third reason was the opera-
tion of land markets which, although not officially recognized, had made the sale or mort-24
gaging of land considerably easier while at the same time serving to exclude those who
lacked land from earning enough money to purchase land. The fourth reason was the in-
creased prosperity of some, which had given them both the resources and the willingness
to buy additional land in order to enhance their productive base. The fifth reason was that
many farmers with a very small holding of land had come to believe that the returns to
productive activity in farming were less than engaging in wage labour. The sixth reason
was that there were more wage labouring opportunities, and although rural wages are low
the relative return to rural waged labour has increased. The seventh reason was that salini-
zation and poor irrigation had, on occasion, led to low land values that had in turn encour-
aged sales by very small farmers. It can be noted that these mechanisms have been largely
confirmed in more recent fieldwork in two southern provinces (Akram-Lodhi, 2001a; Ak-
ram-Lodhi, 2001b).
Four interrelated points can be made regarding the stratification of landholdings in
Vietnam in the 1990s. The first is that landlord tenant relations, including sharecropping,
have returned to rural Vietnam during the 1990s (GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.6), albeit on a lim-
ited scale. Thus, as noted above in 1998 some 15 per cent of agricultural households
rented-in land and some 6 per cent of agricultural households rented-out land. The second
point is that landlessness in rural Vietnam is increasing. In 1993, some 8.2 per cent of rural
households did not have any land. By 1998, this figure had increased to 10.1 per cent
(Government of Vietnam-Donor-NGO Poverty Working Group (PWG), 1999: Table 2.4).
In 1998, some 9.8 per cent of agricultural households sold land, but only 2.5 per cent of
agricultural households bought land (GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.10). The growth in landless-
ness was particularly pronounced in the southeast region around Ho Chi Minh City, and in
the Mekong Delta, the ‘rice bowl’ of Vietnam. The third point is that fragmentation of
landholdings has increased significantly since decollectivization. For example, in the Red
River Delta, where the average size of a farm is less than 0.3 hectares, the average number
of plots that constitute an operational holding are between 8 and 9 (World Bank, 1998: 10).
The fourth point is that the stratification of landholdings helps explain Resolution 6 of
1998. Although the 1993 Land Law stipulated maximum farm size, by 1995 there were
already 113700 farms in excess of 5 hectares and 1900 farms in excess of 10 hectares. In-
deed, in some southern provinces it is possible to come across privately owned farms that25
are implicitly condoned by the state and by the CPV that are in excess of 1000 hectares
3
(Akram-Lodhi, 2001a). While these farms constituted only 1.1 per cent of farm house-
holds, it is worth stressing that 66 per cent of these farms were in the Mekong Delta
(World Bank, 1998: 10). In a sense then Resolution 6 was simply an ex post recognition of
changes in the agrarian structure that had already occurred. In February 2000, when the
state reiterated its intention to implement Resolution 6, it was revealed that these so-called
‘large scale’ farms generated an average household income of US$7500 per year, well
above the average per capita national income of US$350 (Vietnam Investment Review 14
February 2000). Resolution 6 suggests that there are those in the state and in the CPV that
want land stratification to continue, and that these people have, in effect, won any argu-
ment that might have occurred within the CPV and the state.
One of the primary factors promoting the stratification of land in rural Vietnam was
formal sector debt. However, formal sector debt was and is a very new concept in rural
Vietnam. Moreover, debt can be a necessary input in production, in that it can be used to
fund investment in working and fixed capital, and in so doing can enhance dynamic pro-
ductive efficiency. It is therefore worth examining the development of the rural financial
system, if only to better understand the relationship between debt and differentiation. This
is done in the following section.
3.4 Debt and investment in the 1990s
As indicated in Appendix Table A1, in the early 1990s Vietnam created a rural fi-
nancial system. This consists of the Vietnam Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development
(VBARD), the People’s Credit Funds (PCFs), and the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP).
                                                
3 One such farm is controlled by a CPV district secretary, while another is controlled by the Deputy Director
of the provincial Department for Agriculture and Rural Development. It is quite common to find the wealthi-
est farmers in communes having strong CPV connections such as being Party Secretary (Akram-Lodhi,
2001b). Watts (1998: 490) terms those who use party connections in business and trade ‘nomenklatura entre-
preneurs’. Perhaps it is time to call those agriculturalists with CPV connections ‘nomenklatura proto-
capitalist farmers’26
The VBARD is the largest rural financial institution, with over 2500 branches (World
Bank, 1998: 39). By the end of 1995, loans to agricultural households accounted for 79 per
cent of all credit issued (Jansen, 1998: 12). At the end of 1997, the VBARD had loans out-
standing with 3.7 million households. Some 67 per cent of these loans were in agriculture,
and 80 per cent were short term. The average size of loan outstanding was US$430, which,
it should be noted, was well in excess of per capita national income (World Bank, 1998:
39). The PCFs had, by the end of 1997, some 497000 shareholding members, and some
VND 1200 billion in loans outstanding, an average of US$172 per loan (World Bank,
1998: 39). It can be noted that the average size of outstanding loan amounted to one-half
per capita national income. The bulk of these outstanding loans were also short term. The
VBP operated through the VBARD network, and offered loans at subsidized, below-
market interest rates to those deemed ‘poor’.
The creation of the rural financial system may have brought about a significant
change in the structure of access to credit in rural Vietnam. According to the 1998 VLSS
(GSO, 1999: Table 8.2.1), some 54 per cent of rural households owed money, of which 43
per cent had been obtained from informal sources. This situation appears to differ greatly
from that reported in the 1993 VLSS (GSO, 1994: Table 8.2.2). In the earlier survey, some
47 per cent of rural households were indebted. Thus, between 1993 and 1998 rural debt
increased. However, in the earlier survey some 73 per cent of rural debt was owed to in-
formal sources. Thus, between 1993 and 1998 there has been a decline in the importance of
informal sources and a corresponding increase in the importance of formal rural financial
institutions. This structural change in the composition of debt may help explain trends in
the stratification of land. It may be the case that informal sources of credit may be less
likely to foreclose on debts, preferring instead to lock debtors into a web of interlocking
transactions that increase their capacity to ‘regulate’ the economic environment in their
favour. By way of contrast, formal sources of debt may have less recourse to alternative
forms of repayment, such as that offered by interlocking transactions, and are thus more
likely to foreclose on unpaid debt, especially if such land can then be sold. Whether this is
in fact the case in rural Vietnam is an open question in need of further research. What is
not in doubt is that the composition of the sources of debt has changed, and that this has
been accompanied by increases in the liquidation of holdings in order to settle outstanding27
debt. In this regard, it was worth stressing that in both the earlier and the later VLSS fewer
households in richer expenditure quintiles were in debt when compared to households in
poorer expenditure quintiles (GSO, 1999: Table 8.2.3; GSO, 1994, Table 8.2.7). This was
so even though the volume of borrowing amongst poorer households was, on a per unit of
land basis, much lower than that of the relatively better off rural households (Wiens, 1998:
77). The liquidation of land is thus more likely to take place amongst the relatively less
well off, opening up land for purchase for the relatively better off. In this way, differentia-
tion may be debt-driven (Akram-Lodhi, 2001a, 2001b).
Some 64 per cent of all rural loans in the 1998 VLSS had been taken out to acquire
working capital, and some 4 per cent had been taken for basic investment (GSO, 1999: Ta-
ble 8.2.7). There are, however, differences in the acquisition of debt when considered by
expenditure quintiles. In the 1993 VLSS the bulk of lending to poorer households was for
consumption; only 37 per cent of lending was used for productive investment. By way of
contrast, for the wealthiest expenditure quintiles, 67 per cent of borrowing was for produc-
tive investment (Wiens, 1998: 77). There was, in particular, a strongly positive relationship
between rural income and new investment in machinery in 1993 (Wiens, 1998: 73).
Clearly, then, debt has been used to fund spending on investments in the means of produc-
tion, in particular by wealthier expenditure quintiles, and indeed investment is an important
variable when assessing accumulation in Vietnam. Between 1981 and 1985 the share of
investment in agriculture as a proportion of total government investment was 18.3 per cent
(Fforde and de Vylder, 1989: 141). Although this was a decline relative to 1976-1980,
economic circumstances had changed. Vietnam’s ongoing integration in the trading block
of the communist countries gave it access to trade-based development co-operation, ODA,
and technical aid, all of which served to loosen the investment constraints facing the rural
economy in the late 1970s. In addition, some of the larger investments made during the late
1970s came on stream, and started to have an effect on production and productivity.
Moreover, between 1986 and 1988, just prior to formal decollectivization, investment in
agriculture as a proportion of total government investment increased, to stand at more than
20 per cent, further loosening the constraints facing the rural economy. Much of this in-
vestment was directed at further extending the irrigated area in the Red River Delta, while28
other investments were directed at developing the production of tropical crops such as cof-
fee and rubber in the Central Highlands.
Having said that, investment in agriculture is generally low, standing at only 7 per
cent of total investment (ANZDEC, 2000: 60). The bulk of this investment comes from the
state budget and from SOEs; only 35 per cent of agricultural investment comes from the
private sector. Thus, as demonstrated in Table 3 in 1998 public investment in agriculture
constituted only 13.9 per cent of total public investment, only 14.7 per cent of the govern-
ment budget and only 3.73 per cent of agricultural GDP. If agriculture had received public
investment commensurate with its share of GDP, it would have received double its alloca-
tion of government resources. However, it is worth noting that public investment does not
meet targets set for it by the annual Public Investment Programme, indicating a lack of
disbursement. Moreover, ODA plays a major role in facilitating that investment that does
take place. ODA currently supports 133 agricultural projects in rural Vietnam, providing
82 per cent of the funding of these projects (Vietnam Investment Review 25 June 2001).
The bulk of that investment which does take place is in irrigation, forestry and land recla-
mation. Finally, it is worth indicating that the mid-1990s boom in foreign direct investment
(FDI) into Vietnam—in 1995 FDI was equivalent to 8.8 per cent of GDP—totally missed
the agricultural sector. Of the US$16.6 billion of implemented FDI that had flowed into
Vietnam by October 2000, only 5.2 per cent had been directed at agriculture and forestry
(Vietnam Economic Times, November 2000). During the first six months of 2001, of the
200 FDI projects approved by the Ministry of Planning and Investment, worth US$968.13
million, only 9 projects, worth US$12.17 million, were directed at the agro-forestry sector
(Vietnam Investment Review 2 July 2001). Clearly, agriculture was not a priority sector for
foreign investors.
Thus, although credit is used in rural Vietnam to fund spending on working and
fixed capital, low levels of overall investment suggest that debt has not been an effective
means by which to generate investment in working and fixed capital. Rather, the role of
debt has been to drive peasant class differentiation. Of course, it is probably unwise to
generalize findings across the breadth and depth of the agricultural sector. There are clear
differences in the levels of debt held between expenditure quintiles, and investment in
working and fixed capital differs across different classes of farmers. As noted, poorer29
farmers tend to acquire consumption-derived debt. Wealthier farmers tend to acquire
higher volumes of credit, but lesser volumes of debt, and use the credit for productive in-
vestment in farm equipment and machinery. If this is the case, it might be expected that
differences in the use of credit might lead to differences in the technical coefficients of
production. It is to investigating this possibility that attention now turns.
3.5 Non-land inputs and the technical coefficients of production in the 1990s
Changes in rural relations of production driven by alterations in the structure of
property rights and the acquisition of debt have been accompanied by fundamental changes
in the structure of non-land inputs in rural Vietnam. Table 4 demonstrates changes in the
structure of inputs between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s. As is demonstrated in Table
4, in the period between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s the amount of arable land per
capita declined. However, despite this decline, the total amount of land devoted to cereal
production, primarily rice, the principal agricultural use-value, increased by 31 per cent.
This extension of the area devoted to rice was accompanied by an intensification of pro-
duction. The proportion of the cropped area irrigated increased by more than 28 per cent;
the use of fertilizers increased eight times, and the number of tractors increased more than
fourfold. Clearly, there have been changes the technical coefficients of production in Viet-
namese agriculture as a whole.
The only area in which the choice of technique did not appear to radically alter in
the aggregate was in the use of hired labour. However, this may be due to an under report-
ing of labour hiring. That the average annual rate of decline in wage employment in agri-
culture between 1993 and 1998 was 4.7 per cent, as is claimed by the World Bank, seems
open to doubt (PWG, 1999: Table 3.4). It has already been noted that the World Bank in
the mid 1990s was demonstrating extensive use of hired labour. Field surveys indicate that
there is a great deal of heterogeneity across rural Vietnam with respect to the use of hired
labour (Akram-Lodhi, 2001c), and aggregate all-Vietnam figures could conceivably hide
important sources of differences across farms in particular parts of rural Vietnam. Less
doubtful is the fact that between 1993 and 1998 there was, at 0.8 per cent, almost no
change in overall household farm employment (PWG, 1999: Tables 3.2 and 3.4). At the
same time, however, even aggregate figures demonstrate that household farm employment30
has restructured. Between 1993 and 1998 household farm employment of males decreased
by 0.3 per cent per annum, while household farm employment of females increased by 0.9
per cent per annum (PWG, 1999: Table 3.2). Farm production is, in this sense, becoming
‘feminized’, a trend that commenced during the 1980s and has continued. However, as just
noted, Resolution 6 ends restrictions on the rural labour market, and this may have impli-
cations for gender relations in agriculture. So too will the growth in landlessness as peasant
class differentiation continues.
Although Table 4 indicates that there has been substantial change in the technical
coefficients of production in Vietnamese agriculture between the late 1970s and the 1990s,
this does not mean that change has been the same for all farms. Land labour ratios may be
restrictively tight in rural Vietnam, but that does not mean that they are restrictively tight
for all farms in the same way. In other words, Table 4 does not provide evidence that iden-
tical technical coefficients of production are used across farms. Therefore, Table 5 presents
evidence on changes in crop cultivation expenses by per capita expenditure quintile, as de-
rived from the VLSS. Four important points can be made regarding the table. The first
point is that working capital continues to be, as would be expected, an important expense.
However, for wealthier expenditure quintiles working capital became a relatively less im-
portant expense between 1993 and 1998. Thus, while expenses on seed, fertilizers and in-
secticides amounted to 85 per cent of total expenses for the poorest expenditure quintile in
1993, they also amounted to 72 per cent of total expenses for the wealthiest expenditure
quintile. By way of contrast, in 1998 such expenses amounted to 78 per cent of total ex-
penses for the poorest expenditure quintile, but only 40 per cent of expenses for the
wealthiest expenditure quintile. The second point to emerge from the table is the source of
the difference: the provision of private productive services such as the rental of draft ani-
mals, the maintenance and repair of agricultural equipment, and fuel, along with equipment
rental. Equipment rental became, in absolute terms, more important for all farmers between
1993 and 1998. However, for the wealthiest expenditure quintile equipment rental grew in
both absolute importance and relative importance. By 1998 equipment rental accounted for
almost 37 per cent of crop cultivation expenses, which was almost three times that of any
other expenditure quintile. Considering productive services and equipment rental together,
whereas in 1993 the amount spent on these expenses averaged between 11 and 12 per cent31
of all expenses regardless of expenditure quintile, by 1998 a reasonably clear positive rela-
tionship between expenditure quintile and productive services and equipment rental ex-
penses had emerged. Thus, for the poorest expenditure quintile in 1998 such expenses ac-
counted for 19 per cent of all expenses. By way of contrast, for the wealthiest expenditure
quintile such expenses accounted for almost 49 per cent of all expenses. The third point
that should be made is that the table understates the role of hired labour in crop cultivation
expenses, as a result of a quirk in the presentation of the data of the VLSS. In addition to
the expenses for labour indicated in the labour hiring column, labour expenses for those
providing draft animals and those operating equipment are included in the services column.
Thus, although the data shows that labour hiring is indeed important for the wealthiest ex-
penditure quintiles, it is in fact more important than is indicated in the table. The fourth
point that emerges from the table is a function of the previous three, and is also the most
important one: clearly, technical coefficients of production differ across expenditure quin-
tiles in rural Vietnam. However, this finding is not surprising. The ability to rent draft ani-
mals and equipment, labour-power and maintain machinery is not resource-neutral. Neither
is the ownership of these inputs (Akram-Lodhi, 2001c). Differences in technical coeffi-
cients of production, when considered in light of the fact that certain inputs are not re-
source-neutral, suggests that access to these key production inputs may be differentiated on
the basis of the resource capacity of farms. Indeed, acquiring these inputs is not only done
so that they can be used on farm. An increasing share of these resource-biased inputs are
owned by relatively wealthier farmers and are rented to relatively poor farmers. As one
farmer operating 900 hectares in the Plain of Reeds in the Mekong Delta stated,
I used my savings to buy a water pump which I use to water neighbouring rice
fields. The money that I earn from this is just enough to cover the cost of culti-
vating my rice field. As I result, I lose nothing and keep all the income from the
crop (Vietnam News 9 April 2001).
As the example demonstrates, an important indicator of the resource capacity of
farms is the size of holding which, as has been demonstrated, is becoming stratified. Tak-
ing these two points together, it would appear that rural Vietnam has at least two different
classes of farmers. One—call them ‘rich peasants—has relatively larger holdings, less
debt, uses more capital-intensive methods of production on their farms, and hires out mod-
ern farm equipment and machinery. The second—call them ‘small peasants’—has rela-32
tively smaller holdings, more debt, uses more labour-intensive methods of production, and
hires in modern farm equipment and machinery. This typology will be further explored
below.
3.6 Productivity and accumulation in rural Vietnam
Changes in the agrarian structure and in the technical coefficients of production
might be thought to have an impact on foodgrain production and availability. This impact
is illustrated in Figure 3, which demonstrates the impressive ‘takeoff’ in foodgrain produc-
tion that occurred in the late 1980s, particularly following the depression of staples pro-
duction in the 6 years following 1982, when an emerging food crisis was exacerbated by
bad weather in 1987 and 1988.
In Vietnam the most important foodgrain is rice. Over the period between 1990 and
1998, paddy production accounted for an average of 90.3 per cent of all foodgrain produc-
tion when measured by volume (World Bank, 2000b). Indeed, rice accounts for almost half
the gross value of agricultural production, and the rate of growth of paddy production has,
at times, outstripped the rate of growth of foodgrain production. Moreover, increased
paddy production has been translated into increased farm revenues, increased farm income,
and increased rural expenditure. Between 1993 and 1998 rural household incomes in-
creased by almost 28 per cent. Farm revenues from rice production grew by 21.2 per cent
during the period. This accounted for approximately one-half of the growth in agricultural
revenues over the five years. It also accounted for perhaps as much as one-third of the
growth of rural household incomes, and therefore a significant fraction of the 30 per cent
rise in rural real per capita expenditure in Vietnam over the period (PWG, 1999: Tables 3.7
and 3.8 and Figure 4.2).
Overall, agricultural output increased at 5.1 per cent per annum between 1988 and
1998 (ANZDEC, 2000: 22). In order to assess the significance of the growth of foodgrain
production since the late 1980s, median growth rates can be plotted on a scatterplot and a
negative reciprocal regression line fitted to the trend
4. This is done in Figure 4, which
demonstrates a rise in estimated median growth rates from about 2 per cent a year in the
                                                
4 I am indebted to Marc Wuyts for demonstrating the properties of the negative reciprocal transformation to
me.33
early 1960s to about 6.5 per cent a year by the late 1990s. Moreover, just as importantly,
the pattern is heteroscedastic, with variation around the regression line visibly diminishing
over time. Similar patterns are observed for availability and per capita availability, al-
though the growth rates are not nearly as dramatic. Figure 3 also appears to demonstrate a
possible point of influence in foodgrain production and availability around 1987, in that
the trend rate of growth in both production and availability appears to have significantly
increased after 1988. Boxplots of Dfbeta statistics for foodgrain availability and per capita
foodgrain availability confirm that 1987 is indeed a point of influence. As such, it pulls
down the overall growth rate over the entire period. Thus, the impressive supply response
demonstrated in Figure 4 is in all probability an underestimate of trend growth in foodgrain
availability and per capita foodgrain availability in the period between 1988 and 1997
(Mukherjee, White and Wuyts, 1998: 138).
As Jansen (1998: 9) observes, the growth in gross agricultural output was a direct
function of two factors: intensity and yields. In 1985, prior to formal decollectivization, the
ratio of the sown area to the cultivated area stood at 1.3 (ANZDEC, 2000: 7). The trans-
formation of the relations of production resulted in an expansion of double and triple crop-
ping. Thus, the ratio of sown area to cultivated area has grown rapidly, to stand at 1.7 crops
per year in 1998. The rate of growth of rice cropping intensity is thus 2.1 per cent per year.
In terms of yields, in 1979-81 cereal yields per hectare amounted to 2049 kilograms. By
1996-98, this had risen to 3754 kilograms per hectare.
In terms of aggregate productivity, Figure 5 presents indexed data on agricultural
value added per worker and per hectare, using 1986 as the base of the index. Figure 5
demonstrates that the moderate upward trend in productivity stopped in 1988, giving way
to an impressive improvement in trend productivity growth in both per worker and per
hectare terms. In order to decompose the basis of this productivity growth, and in particu-
lar the relationship between the means of production, the technical coefficients of produc-
tion and agrarian performance, Jansen’s (1998: Table 2) estimates are presented in Table 6.
Jansen constructs a log-linear Cobb Douglas production function in which agricultural out-
put is a function of land, labour, livestock, fertilizer and machines, in order to estimate the
contribution of each factor to output growth and productivity growth. According to Jan-
sen’s analysis, in the period of collective agriculture the attempt to strengthen co-operative34
farming led to an expansion of the sown area and investment in machinery and equipment,
although, as was discussed above, much of this investment was to replace existing machin-
ery and equipment in need of repair. However, the investment and incentive weaknesses of
the system fostered declining productivity, as illustrated in the contribution of total factor
productivity to growth. Following Directive 100, co-operatives shifted to household con-
tracts, in order to improve incentives. Farming intensity increased, as evidenced by the rise
in the contribution of fertilizer to growth, and by the increased importance of labour in ag-
ricultural growth. Productivity improved considerably. However, the growth regime en-
gendered by Directive 100 quickly lost momentum, even though productivity continued to
improve. Finally, Resolution 10 formally decollectivized agriculture. This led to an expan-
sion of the sown area. However, it also led to increased application of working capital, in
particular fertilizer. In the presence of formal restrictions on the use of labour-power, it
also led to renewed spending on investment goods, that is to say machinery and equipment.
The rationale behind such investment was clear: the return to such investment was very
high indeed. Thus, ‘one Vietnamese dong invested in equipment or related other costs is
associated with a gross annual return of 4-5 dong worth of paddy, other things being equal’
(Wiens, 1998: 84). An important component of this return was the rental of farm machin-
ery and equipment by relatively wealthier farmers to relatively poorer farmers (Vietnam
News 9 April 2001). Productivity growth per se petered out, and ‘agricultural growth
is…mainly determined by the increase in purchased inputs’ (Jansen, 1998: 11). This is
consistent with the composition of credit and debt discussed above, and with changes in
the technical coefficients of production demonstrated in Tables 4 and 5. Jansen’s findings
suggest that despite the transformation in the rural relations of production, the impact on
the forces of production is less clear. There have been improvements in dynamic produc-
tive efficiency, to be sure, but whether Figure 5 indicates that there has been a structural
shift in the parameters of dynamic productive efficiency appears less certain. This suggests
that the process of agrarian transition may currently be fettered by an inability to further
alter the technical coefficients of production in a manner consistent with ongoing processes
of peasant class differentiation.
That the technical coefficients of production have already been altered in a manner
consistent with changes in the agrarian structure is illustrated in Table 7, which displays35
differences in productivity amongst farms by arraying paddy productivity per hectare in
1993 and 1998 by expenditure quintiles. The results are quite striking. In 1993 the differ-
ence between the least productive expenditure quintile and the most productive expendi-
ture quintile was 325 kilos per hectare. Although wealth was correlated with productivity,
the relationship was not linear: the wealthiest expenditure quintile was not the most pro-
ductive. By 1998, circumstances had dramatically changed. The difference between the
least productive expenditure quintile and the most productive expenditure quintile was 740
kilos per hectare. Whereas productivity for the poorest wealth expenditure quintile in-
creased by just over 15 per cent, productivity for the wealthiest expenditure quintile in-
creased by 31.6 per cent. Moreover, the correlation between wealth and productivity had
become clearer: the wealthier the household, the more productive it was. In a sense, this is
hardly surprising, given the already established findings that wealthier farms invest more
in productive purposes, and that the return in particular to investment in farm equipment
and machinery can be on the order of 400 to 500 per cent (Wiens, 1998: 84). As a result, ‘it
cannot be argued that smaller (and poorer) farmers in Vietnam are more productive than
larger (and richer) ones’ (Wiens, 1998: 72; Akram-Lodhi, 2001c). Indeed, in the 1993
VLSS Wiens (1998: 87) calculated that smaller farms, defined as those of less than 0.25
hectares, had only 41 per cent of the total factor productivity of larger farms, defined as
those of more than 2 hectares.
Differential access to the principal means of production, differential technical coef-
ficients of production, and differential productivity strongly suggests that farms in rural
Vietnam may not necessarily be pursuing the same production purpose. This is supported
by evidence contained in Figure 6, which demonstrates the share of paddy retained for self
consumption versus the share of paddy destined for market sales by expenditure quintiles.
As such, Figure 6 demonstrates the spread of generalized commodity production in rural
Vietnam, the distribution of the production of exchange-value by expenditure quintiles
and, by inference, the farms in rural Vietnam that may be beginning to produce surplus-
value. Figure 6 demonstrates that the poorer quintiles retain the bulk of their paddy, and
market proportionally less. Thus, poorer quintiles remain, at best, only partially integrated
into generalized commodity production and perhaps can be thought of as ‘subsistence’
farmers. Watts (1998: 491) notes that this strata is ‘a semi-proletarianized rural workforce36
which is some ways approximates Lenin’s notion of the “propertied worker”’ because in-
sufficient productive assets compels them to sell labour-power. By way of contrast, the
wealthier quintiles market the bulk of their paddy, and retain a much smaller fraction of
output. These farms are primarily engaged in the production of exchange-value. It is even
possible that amongst some of these farms the transition has been completed, and they are
engaged in the production of surplus value. Evidence indicates that although rice produc-
tion is the most important component of agricultural output, the most dynamic growth has
occurred in non-rice production. Between 1993 and 1998 farm revenues from perennial
crops increased by 127 per cent, from fruit trees increased by 112 per cent, from perennial
crops increased by 66 per cent, and from livestock and aquaculture increased by 52 per
cent (PWG, 1999: Table 3.8). By 1998, the latter category accounted for 31 per cent of to-
tal agricultural revenue, second only to rice. This data suggests that rural accumulation is
driven by the non-rice sector, a suggestion consistent with the analysis of both Watts
(1998: 492) and the World Bank (World Bank/Asian Development Bank/United Nations
Development Programme, 2000: 11). In this light, it is not surprising that there are differ-
ing degrees of integration into generalized commodity production amongst poorer and
wealthier paddy producing households in rural Vietnam.
In fostering accumulation in Vietnam, especially amongst relatively wealthier rural
households, the role of rice as an exchange-value has been twofold. Rice is the principal
wage good in Vietnam, and is also an important source of export earnings. Between 1990
and 1998, Vietnamese GDP grew at 8.4 per cent per annum. Private consumption in-
creased at an average annual growth rate of 10.2 per annum between 1990 and 1998, while
private consumption per capita increased at an annual average growth rate of 8.2 per cent
over the same period (World Bank, 2000a: Table 4.10). In 1998, food, which had ac-
counted for over 76 per cent of total expenditure in 1986 (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: Ta-
ble 3.14), accounted for 49 per cent of private consumption per capita, when expressed in
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Breads and cereals accounted for 21 per cent of pri-
vate consumption per capita, when expressed in PPP terms (World Bank, 2000a: Table
4.11). Moreover, breads and cereals were under priced by 3 per cent in 1998 when com-
pared to international equivalents, suggesting that the intersectoral terms of trade may have
been used to facilitate the provision of a wage goods surplus (World Bank, 2000a: Table37
4.12). This suggestion should however be treated with extreme care, as the available Viet-
namese data on the intersectoral terms of trade, and the volume of intersectoral resource
flows, is extremely fragmentary.
In the 1980s, it appeared that the terms of trade moved against agriculture, as state
trading companies used their dominant position in the rice market in particular to increase
their margins relative to input prices when agricultural production increased in the early
1980s (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: Table 5.6). In the mid-1990s, based upon data col-
lected in Ho Chi Minh City and in Hanoi between 1989 and 1994, Fforde and Sénèque
(1995: 122) suggested ‘the terms of trade have improved for agricultural producers across
Vietnam’. More recently, van Donge, White and Nghia (1999: 45) have suggested that the
ratio of the price of fertilizer to the price of paddy fell from 3.5 to about 1.7 between 1991
and 1995, also suggesting an improvement in the terms of trade facing agriculture. By way
of contrast, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (1996: 149) deflated
the farmgate price of paddy by the consumer price index and found that the real price of
paddy declined by 3.1 per cent a year between 1989 and 1995. Similarly, Jansen (1998: 18)
has calculated the intersectoral terms of trade, using the GDP deflators for agriculture and
non-agriculture. Jansen has found that while there was an improvement in the intersectoral
terms of trade, to the benefit of agriculture, between 1986 and 1988, between 1991 and
1995 there was a gradual deterioration in the intersectoral terms of trade. As a conse-
quence, relative prices in 1993/95 were below those in 1986/91. Van Donge, White and
Nghia (1999: 45) have noted that in 1995 and 1996 the ratio of the price of fertilizer to the
price of paddy rose from 1.7 to 2.2, suggesting a deterioration in the intersectoral terms of
trade facing agriculture. They also note that, as in the IFPRI study, in 1996 the rice price
declined while the consumer price index rose. This further indicates a relative decline in
the terms of trade facing agriculture. They conclude that ‘the terms of trade are moving
against rice producers…in recent years’ (van Donge, White and Nghia, 1999: 45). Finally,
between April 1999 and April 2000 food prices shrank by 9.7 per cent while non-food
prices rose by 1 per cent. Rice prices during this period fell to a 10-year low, garnering a
market price that was only 30 per cent more than the cost of production (Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review 8 June 2000). The GSO reported that if the sale of farm products in 1998
allowed the purchase of four industrial products, by 2000 an identical amount of farm38
product sales only allowed the purchase of three industrial products (Vietnam News 9 April
2001). Clearly, while the tentative evidence would seem to suggest a shift against agricul-
ture, there is need for further research on the intersectoral terms of trade. Nonetheless, it is
the case that the provision of the wage goods surplus did, no doubt, contribute to macro-
economic success during the 1990s, in that it served to dampen the inflationary pressures
that had been so severe in 1987. Indeed, in 1999 the rate of growth of consumer prices
was, for a time, negative.
In terms of the volume of intersectoral flows, a common view that has been held is
that agriculture is lightly taxed, with between 5 and 10 per cent of output being directed to
the state (Mellor, 1993). Indeed, a more recent analysis of the 1998 VLSS indicates that all
direct taxes amount to 3.7 per cent of household expenditure, the bulk of which is ac-
counted for by the agricultural land tax, with fees and contributions comprising the re-
mainder (Bao, Haughton and Quan, forthcoming). The taxation of agriculture was also
found to be regressive, a finding that was confirmed in research conducted for the World
Bank (Government of Vietnam-Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure Review
(PER), 2000a: 50). This latter research however also found that in an unrepresentative
sample of households the proportion of income paid as direct taxes, fees and contributions
could vary from between 2 and 41 per cent. Watts (1998: 485-489) has similarly conducted
a detailed analysis of agricultural taxes in one district in northern Vietnam that challenges
the conventional wisdom that agriculture is lightly taxed. He estimates a direct tax burden
on land equivalent to 17 per cent of output in one district, and suggests that the tax load in
the district ‘are probably indicative of a widespread underestimation of the current fiscal
burden imposed on rural peasants’ (Watts, 1998: 489). Clearly, this is an area in need of
further research. However, what Watts also stresses is that even if tax levels are higher
than are commonly supposed this does not necessarily mean that resources are flowing out
of the agricultural sector. As a result of economic reforms, the flow of resources from the
central government to local government has dramatically reduced. Many of the rural fees
and contributions line the pockets of corrupt cadres. However, rural fees and contributions
can also be used to fund important local developmental and social security services and if
these fees and contributions were reduced, these services would be cut. Certainly, there is39
an important need to increases the transparency of local fees and contributions. However,
this does not imply that agricultural taxes should necessarily be cut.
In terms of export earnings, rice has made a major contribution to the Vietnamese
economy, reducing the balance of payments deficit and easing the foreign exchange con-
straint. In 1988, Vietnam still had to import rice, as implied in Figure 2. In 1989, the coun-
try exported rice for the first time: 1.4 million tons, to be precise. Since that time, rice ex-
ports have grown dramatically in volume and in value, as indicated in Table 8. With the
exception of petroleum, rice is Vietnam’s most important export, and Vietnam has
emerged as the second largest exporter of rice in the world. Indeed, one of the explicit rea-
sons given by the state regarding the scrapping of the rice export quota in 2001 was to
promote a further expansion of rice exports.
The role of SOEs in establishing the intersectoral terms of trade has just been
noted. The ability of SOEs to perform this role is a function of their domination in agro-
processing, the inter-provincial rice trade, and the international marketing of a number of
export crops. This market-making role was particularly important with regard to the most
important agricultural export exchange-value, and thus meant that SOEs played an impor-
tant role in the management of rice demand, in effect standing between peasants and the
market. However, it is not clear whether the presence of SOEs in rice marketing has re-
stricted the realization of exchange-value that accrues from the international sale of rice.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s SOEs relied on foreign aid to sustain their viability.
Following the boost in agricultural production that came about as a result of Directive 100,
the state substantially increased its margins, in order to capture the benefits of productivity
increases and reassert control over the market (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: 176). This
changed in 1989, when SOEs stopped receiving direct subsidies, when state procurement
ended, when the price differential between the state prices and private ‘unorganized’ prices
had come close to reaching parity, and when the share of the state in internal staples trade
started to decline. Direct subsidies were replaced by indirect subsidies, in the form of loans
at concessionary interest rates, from state-owned commercial banks, debt forgiveness by
state-owned commercial banks, and tax exemptions. The state also instituted a programme
of ‘equitization’ of SOEs in the 1990s, in order to enhance the role played by competitive40
pressures in economic decision making. However, the pace of equitization was slow. Thus,
in 1999 only some 50 SOEs were equitized (ANZDEC, 2000: 23).
Some anecdotal evidence suggests that some SOEs operating in agriculture were
inefficient. Thus, during the 1980s it is estimated that some 50 per cent of the staples sup-
plied to the state failed to reach those in receipt of rations (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996:
182). In the mid-1990s it was estimated that SOEs incurred marketing costs that were 10
per cent higher than those incurred by private traders (Khiem, 1996: 32). More recently,
some 17 per cent of SOEs in agriculture owned by the central government made losses in
1998 (PER, 2000b: 44). However, it is not clear whether SOEs involved in rice processing
and marketing made losses. Moreover, SOEs make substantial tax payments to the gov-
ernment, in part because they accrue so much of the final price of rice. For example, in
1997 the distribution of the final price of rice witnessed 16 per cent going to farmers, 9 per
cent going to small traders, 16 per cent going to wholesalers and millers, 15 per cent going
to export agents, and 44 per cent going to SOEs (Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 De-
cember 1997). Thus, the net impact of SOEs on the dynamic productive efficiency of the
agricultural sector remains to be seen (PER, 2000b: 44).
Clearly, SOEs have an impact upon accumulation; it is just not clear what is the
impact. What is clear is that over the course of the agrarian transition in Vietnam important
sources of difference have emerged in the countryside. The separation of the direct produc-
ers from the means of production, a process that is embodied in differential ownership of
land and capital inputs, has proceeded, and is witnessed in differences in land holdings,
differences in the technical coefficients of production, and differences in productivity. A
small class of rich peasants is emerging. It remains to be seen whether rich peasants have
the potential to turn themselves into a class of proto-capitalists. Nonetheless, this separa-
tion is a key structural feature of the development of the capitalist mode of production, as it
is separation that fosters the emergence of exploitation and the production of surplus value
(Lenin, 1968). However, despite the unparalleled supply response witnessed in rural Viet-
nam during the 1980s and 1990s and the potential that this suggests for peasant class dif-
ferentiation, this process is not yet complete. Vietnam remains dominated by small peas-
ants, operating small plots of land with small quantities of capital inputs, producing pri-
marily for subsistence. Thus, while there has been a transformation in rural relations of41
production, the shift to generalized commodity production remains incomplete. Similarly,
while improvements in dynamic productive efficiency have been witnessed, the evidence
that these improvements are sufficient to warrant being considered a structural break is
lacking. The unfettering of the forces of production is, at best, partial.
3.7 Poverty and inequality
The processes of peasant class differentiation emerging out of Vietnam’s agrarian
transition would be expected to have an impact on social equity. However, whether this
has been the case remains contentious. In terms of absolute poverty, there was a decline in
its incidence between 1993 and 1998 from 66 per cent to 45 per cent (PWG, 1999: Figure
1.2). The number of undernourished people dropped from 18 million in 1990-92 to 14.2
million in 1997-99 (The Economist 20 October 2001). However, this positive development
may more recently have started to slow. Falling prices for rice, coffee and pepper meant
that between 1998 and 2000 average farm income fell by 17 per cent (Vietnam News 9
April 2001), and it was growth in agriculture that was responsible for the decline in pov-
erty in Vietnam.
Agriculture still accounts for almost 80 per cent of poverty in Vietnam. The process
of agrarian transition is a contributing factor in this poverty, in that ‘differences in land-
holdings…show a link with poverty (PWG, 1999: 28; Oxfam (GB), 1999). In this light, it
might be thought that increases in stratified access to land would explain the increase in the
Gini coefficient for Vietnam from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.35 in 1998 (PWG, 1999: 68). This in-
crease, which is derived from the VLSS, is consistent with the calculations of Dollar and
Litvack (1998: 15), who estimated that the Gini coefficient for Vietnam in 1984 was 0.30,
and that the Gini coefficient would rise to 0.38 by 2000. Such figures as are available are
displayed in Table 9, which suggest that since 1978 it is possible that inequality has in-
creased by some 50 per cent. Such a shift might, it would be thought, cause concern within
the CPV, as the Gini coefficient is coming close to 0.40. The Chinese Communist Party, to
whom the CPV is close, considers a Gini coefficient of 0.40 to represent a socially unac-
ceptable degree of inequity, and Vietnam does appear to be close to breaking this level.
That having been said, though, there is a counter argument: that greater inequality is good,42
because it fosters more rapid integration into generalized commodity production, and in so
doing possibly hastens the successful completion of the agrarian transition.
However, the relationship between peasant class differentiation and inequality is
more complex. Clearly, inequality can be increasing even as poverty is decreasing. How-
ever, trends in the evolution of inequality are not clear, as Tuan (1997) demonstrates. Data
appears to indicate that income distribution had become less equitable in all regions of
Vietnam between 1989 and 1992 (Khiem, 1996: 35). More recently, a Theil L index of
inequality, which permits an understanding of trends in inequality both within groups and
between groups, suggests that inequality in rural Vietnam diminished so slightly as to re-
main basically unchanged between 1993 and 1998 (PWG, 1999: Table 4.2). The main
source of inequality in Vietnam, according to the calculation, is a widening of urban rural
differences. A proper assessment of this issue would require an analysis which went be-
yond the regional differences explored in Vietnam: Attacking Poverty (PWG, 2000). There
is a need to assess the relationship between inequality, access to assets, positions within the
production process, and the extent of integration into generalized commodity production,
and to conduct such an assessment within and across particular regions. However, such an
assessment is beyond the scope of this article.
With the analytical framework of agrarian political economy, the shifts that have
been documented in this article can be expected to have an effect on rural politics, because
rural politics is both shaped by and shapes changes in the production process and accumu-
lation. The article therefore turns now to consider developments in rural politics during
Vietnam’s agrarian transition.
3.8 Rural politics in the 1990s
Transformation of the production process and the differentiated impact of agrarian
accumulation both shape and is shaped by rural politics. In Vietnam, the most well known
expression of rural political activity was the struggle against the French and the US for in-
dependence and national unification, a struggle whose social base lay in rural resistance.
While unification did not serve to eliminate rural politics, the ‘mono-organizational so-
cialism’ (Rigby, 1991: 111-112) of the immediate post-unification period witnessed the
CPV seeking to strengthen its position in rural politics. To that end, the CPV assumed43
greater control of local politics, albeit often using local leaders, directed the local state, and
determined the objectives and structure of its mass organization affiliate, the Vietnam
Peasants Association. As a result, political action was often expressed through the use of
the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985), which, through its impact on agricultural produc-
tivity, may have served to contribute to the agrarian crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s.
The process of agrarian transition unleashed during the 1980s has, in many ways,
served to re-ignite a rural politics that had thus been muted during the period of attempted
collectivization. The reason behind the resurgence of local level rural politics in Vietnam
since the mid-1980s is the increasing reliance on markets as the principle mechanism of
resource allocation. As is stressed in agrarian political economy, economic agents enter
into market relations with differential assets that can have an affect upon the operation of
the market. In particular, agents with relatively large quantities of assets can enter markets
from a position in which they seek to ‘regulate’ its operation to their advantage (Akram-
Lodhi, 2000b; Bernstein, 1996). This suggests that markets, predicated as their operation is
on inequity, can serve to deepen existing inequities. This suggestion is reinforced by trends
in the Gini coefficient illustrated in Table 7. The operation of one particular market that
has emerged in Vietnam during the 1990s serves to illustrate this principle: the land mar-
ket. As illustrated above, the tentative evidence that is available suggests that access to
land is becoming differentiated as it becomes, in effect, privately held, and as land accu-
mulation proceeds, albeit to a limited degree, through market exchanges. Yet, in rural
Vietnam, as elsewhere in rural Asia, land is an emotive issue, in that land is more than just
an economic resource; it is also a cultural resource. In this light, it is not surprising that the
operation of the land market has served to galvanize the re-emergence of local rural poli-
tics in Vietnam.
Kerkvliet (1995) offers an excellent account of the development of rural politics
around land issues during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Much of these politics initially
centered upon the issuing of land use certificates by local authorities following the prom-
ulgation of Resolution 10 in 1988. Thus, according to Kerkvliet (1995: 74), between 1988
and mid-1990 some 200000 written complaints were received from villagers disputing the
distribution of land use rights by local authorities. In addition to the allocation of fields,
boundaries were also a subject of dispute. A second allocation that was subject to numer-44
ous complaints was the distribution of the ‘second land fund’, which was arable land allo-
cated by some co-operatives by auction in order to provide resources for community pur-
poses. It would appear that much of this land was taken over, more or less permanently, by
individual households. At the same time, decollectivization resulted, as already noted, in
the return of landlord tenant relations, the return of sharecropping, and the return, albeit to
a limited degree, of a private wage labour market in rural areas. These trends are reasona-
bly clear from the evidence presented in the previous section. Given these various proc-
esses, it is not surprising that rural complaints have been widespread. In seeking redress,
farmers have consistently sought to use official channels, organizing petitions to local and
central authorities and senior CPV officials. In so doing, they have been careful to criticize
individuals, rather than the political system as such. However, when complaints are unsuc-
cessful, as they commonly are, they mutate into disputes. Kerkvliet (1995: 73) cites a 1990
CPV document that notes examples of villagers resorting to violence in their disputes with
each other, engaging in beatings, arson and killings in order to resolve conflict. Rural dis-
putes do not however solely take the form of inter-personal conflict between aggrieved in-
dividuals. Collective grievances have resulted in collective action designed to confront the
state and the agents of the state. Moreover, there are examples of collective action against
the state undertaken by aggrieved peasants turning quite violent.
While Kerkvliet (1995: 72-80) provides numerous examples, one is particularly
striking. In 1991 in Nam Ha province, a group of villagers wanted to retrieve land that had,
in the 1960s, been assigned to an adjacent village. They circulated a petition, but received
no official recognition from district officials. In order to make their point, a sizeable num-
ber of the villagers took control of the village and, in essence, established their own gov-
ernment. Some villagers used roofing tiles to stone the houses of officials, and a commune
official was surrounded by irate villagers who refused to release him until he signed their
petition. Some 300 villagers went about destroying the boundary markers that separated
the disputed land from the village, and when neighbouring villagers objected, a brawl en-
sued, during which time several cadres were beaten and rifles seized from the security
forces who tried to restore order. The petition was eventually considered by district offi-
cials, but they rejected it. The rejection resulted in a tax strike. It is not clear how, but the
authorities were able to restore their control over the village. Nonetheless, deep resent-45
ments remained, and these resentments were responsible in July 1992 for the death of a
villager from the village that controlled the disputed land. The murder resulted in the im-
prisonment of two villagers and the execution of a third.
Local unrest and uprisings over land have festered into wider discontent regarding
the abuse of authority and corruption. This too is a legacy of decollectivization, in that the
retreat of the central state during the 1990s has increased the power of local officials even
as action by peasants operating outside official channels has increased. Thus, peasants and
the local state increasingly intersect. Peasants seek to improve their resource base, while
the local state’s functionaries have used their increased powers for the purposes of rent
seeking. However, resistance against those who are known is often easier than resistance
against those who are not known. Thus, local-level corruption has not just generated dis-
content; it too has mutated into collective action. Once again, Kerkvliet (1995: 78) pro-
vides a dramatic example. In 1989 in Thanh Hoa province commune officials’ corrupt be-
haviour resulted in farmers making allegations of corruption. In response, district officials
put pressure on them to rescind the allegations. Then, in early 1989 elections took place to
choose leaders of two production groups. District officials rejected the choice of the villag-
ers. However, villagers refused to rescind their selection. In June 1989 officers from the
security services came to arrest some of the villagers, as well as the two leaders that had
been elected. Indignant local people surrounded the eleven officials and prevented them
from making the arrests. District and commune officials responded by sending in addi-
tional people from the security services to free the trapped officials. According to Kerkv-
liet, ‘“thousands” of villagers fought back, using sticks, bricks and anything else they
could find’. While it is not known how this confrontation ended, one report took a very
critical attitude to the role of CPV officials in the commune and appeared to sympatheti-
cally present a set of three demands that the villagers wanted met before they would re-
lease the five officials they still held.
Rent seeking by local officials often takes the form of diverting local taxes into
personal pockets. Commune governments collect ‘fees’ and ‘contributions’ for local serv-
ices such as water, electricity, education, infrastructure, child assistance, and the local se-
curity services to supplement the limited resources transferred to them by district and pro-
vincial government. These fees can make up a significant portion of commune revenue—
from 32 to 71 per cent in 6 communes that were recently studied (PER, 2000b: 23). How-46
om 32 to 71 per cent in 6 communes that were recently studied (PER, 2000b: 23). How-
ever, in the raising of these fees, there is no transparency or accountability in either the
collection or the expenditure side, and this gives rise to ample scope for corruption and the
demonstration of collective action as a means of protest.
Indeed, in rural Vietnam protests over land can facilitate the emergence of collec-
tive action that in turn takes on board the issues of corruption and taxation. For example,
from 1988 to late 1992 Thai Binh province in northern Vietnam had 50 serious clashes
over land, many involving villagers wanting to secede from their commune and their co-
operative into new institutions (Kerkvleit, 1995: 78). Corruption and the misappropriation
of land may have been an important factor motivating the clashes. This is because five
years later in May 1997 in Quynh Phu district villagers reported that thousands of farmers,
often led by retired war veterans, peacefully took to the streets in different villages and
near the district offices of the People’s Committee to protest against corruption. In Viet-
nam, May is when local fees and contributions are collected by commune officials. Peas-
ants claimed that the number of taxes that they had to pay had risen from 4 to 21, with little
to show for the money that they had already contributed except local officials able to live
beyond their means (Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 July 1997). Farmers demanded a
public accounting of where the money that they had contributed to local government had
been used. Protests continued off and on for most of the rest of the year, and may have
contributed to the outbreak of protests in Dong Nai province, in southern Vietnam, over
the appropriation of land, as well as the seizure of 20 policeman by angry villagers in
Quynh Hoa district. Both sets of events happened in November 1997, and it was reported
that some villages had sent people to Thai Binh to learn protest strategies (Far Eastern
Economic Review, 2 April 1998).
The protests in Thai Binh may have had repercussions far beyond the confines of
the province, or indeed of rural Vietnam. In the month following the protests, the Central
Committee of the CPV met to select a new Prime Minister, President and General Secre-
tary. The timing of the meeting was a coincidence, but its outcome may have been affected
by the protests. Very little is known about the inner workings of the CPV. However, it
would appear that there is a strong culture of regional and interest group consultation and
consensus within it, a culture that has been, to a degree, shattered by the impact of market-47
oriented reform and the transformation of relations of production (van Donge, White and
Nghia, 1999: 23). Deep divisions have emerged between those who place a premium on
social stability—often called ‘conservatives’ or ‘ideologues’—and those who place a pre-
mium on economic growth—often called ‘liberals’ or ‘reformers’. These divisions may
have been magnified by the events in Thai Binh. The evidence for this assertion is that
following the Central Committee meeting the only appointment that was made was that of
the Prime Minister and he, like his predecessor, appeared to be a supporter of further mar-
ket-oriented reforms. As such, he was an individual who may have been more acceptable
to the protestors. By way of contrast, the view of Do Muoi, the outgoing General Secretary
of the CPV was that the protestors of Thai Binh were ‘narrow minded reactionaries’. How-
ever, when presented with evidence substantiating their complaints, he accepted them,
apologized to the protestors, and accused local officials of corruption (Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review 16 July 1998). The appointment of a new President, one who soon came to
show sympathy for the protestors and for market reform, to replace an individual with only
lukewarm support for market-oriented reforms, was then made in August. The appointment
of a new General Secretary did not take place however until late December 1997, after the
protests had subsided. The appointment of Le Kha Phieu, the former political commissar of
the army, was widely taken to be indicative of the growing political role of conservative
elements based in the army. The concurrent appointment of Do Muoi as ‘senior advisor’
seemed to reinforce this view. On the other hand, however, at the meeting during which
Phieu was appointed the Central Committee of the CPV accepted, after a heated debate and
over the opposition of Do Muoi, the argument in support of Resolution 6. Phieu also met
with retired Lieutenant General Tran Do, former head of the CPV ideology and culture de-
partment and the country’s most prominent dissident, who had called for greater democra-
tization as a response to deepening corruption. Finally, Phieu would have had to counte-
nance the visit of the new President to Thai Binh in March 1998. During the visit, the
President argued that economic reform had had only limited benefits for rural Vietnamese.
He noted that local officials in some regions had embezzled money, that the police in Thai
Binh were at fault, and that the root of rural unrest was corruption (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 5 March 1998). Some 300 local officials were disciplined, the former Chairman of
the Thai Binh People’s Committee was forced to resign from the Central Committee, a fi-48
nancial assistance programme for the province was announced, and a pilot scheme to
monitor decisions was introduced.
The sequence of events makes it appear that the rural protests in Thai Binh shook
the leadership of the CPV. However, despite the appointment of apparent conservatives to
senior positions, the overall response of the leadership to rural unrest does not appear to
have been an effort to address the needs of those rendered subordinate in a differentiating
agricultural sector. Rather, the response appears to have been to address the needs of the
newly emergent Vietnamese rich peasant. Thus, despite the promulgation of Decree 29 on
grassroots democracy, which was undertaken in the wake of Thai Binh, and despite the
CPV jailing hundreds of members, expelling thousands of members, and disciplining tens
of thousands of members for corruption, the most important state initiative taken in agri-
culture in the late 1990s was Resolution 6. Resolution 6 accepts the accumulation of land,
and moreover offers tax relief to accumulating farmers. Indeed, when the Central Com-
mittee of the CPV met in December 1997 and agreed to allow farmers to create larger,
more machine friendly farms, the penultimate page of the document stated the need to ‘al-
low them to become rich’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 February 1998). In this light,
it would be interesting to explore the dynamics of rural politics in the 1990s, and in par-
ticular the role played by rich peasants with respect to the actions of both small peasants
and the state. This is because the actions of the state seem to support the ascendancy of the
rich peasants, and yet it is not clear whether rich peasants take part in rural protest. Clearly,
there is a need for further research in this area.
The emphasis on the need for larger, more efficient farms has recently been re-
peated by the state and by the CPV (World Bank/Asian Development Bank/United Nations
Development Programme, 2000). However, it is unlikely to quell rural unrest. Certainly,
the discontent expressed by the villagers in Quynh Phu is felt in much of rural Vietnam.
Thus, in October 2000 angry peasants protested in central Hanoi against corruption (The
Economist, 11 November 2000). Meanwhile, in central Ho Chi Minh City, hundreds of
peasants camped out over a 6-month period, angry at being displaced from their land. Their
banners and placards are highly critical of official decisions, invoked the words of Ho Chi
Minh, but did not directly criticize the government. The security forces forcibly ended the
protest the day before the arrival of US President Bill Clinton. Then, most notably, in early49
February 2001an estimated 5000 peasants from ethnic minorities took to the streets in
Daklak and Gia Lai provinces for four days (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 March
2001) in the most significant act of rural unrest since unification.
The principal grievance of what were apparently co-ordinated protests was the ex-
propriation of land in the two provinces in order to create coffee plantations under the
control of lowland migrants. The protestors demanded the return of ‘their’ land, and indeed
attacked some of those they accused of encroachment. They also blocked the national
highway linking the two provinces by overturning vehicles, and attacked a post office.
When the security forces responded with riot police, helicopters and water cannon, the
protestors took their grievances to the communes, raiding local offices of the government
and, in some instances, destroying public property. The security forces responded by
cracking down on the countryside, in order to prevent People’s Committees being over-
thrown. It took several weeks for the state to regain control of the situation, during which
time movement into and out of the provinces was restricted. In September 14 people re-
ceived jail sentences of between six and 12 years for taking part in the disturbances (Viet-
nam News 27 September 2001, 28 September 2001).
As was the case with the Thai Binh protests, the central highlands uprising clearly
shook the CPV leadership as it prepared for its 9
th Congress. It weakened the hand of the
General Secretary, who was by this time struggling to retain his position after three prob-
lematic years. In so doing, it opened the door for the elevation of the Chairman of the Na-
tional Assembly, Nong Duc Manh, himself a member of a northern ethnic minority and a
clear reformer, into the position of General Secretary at the Congress. Buttressing this
change, the prime minister and president, both known reformers, agreed to stay in their
posts, even though the former had for some time indicated his desire to step down. Moreo-
ver, in order to strengthen the position of reform, the Congress eliminated the Standing
Committee of the Politbureau, an inner cabinet that had been dominated by more conser-
vative voices. Thus, as in Thai Binh 4 years previously, the protests had a clear political
impact. However, if previous experience of rural politics and collective action in Vietnam
in the 1990s is any example, the peasants in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Daklak and Gia Lai
may have been dispersed, but they have not been satisfied. Given ongoing processes of50
peasant class differentiation, emerging landlessness, and proletarianization, more rural un-
rest is likely.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Ho Chi Minh once said ‘peasants believe in facts, not theories’ (quoted in Lang-
guth, 2000: 36). This article has attempted to examine the ‘facts’ of the process of agrarian
transition in Vietnam over the last two decades. The article began by critically evaluating
the concept of transition and offering a definition of agrarian transition that emphasized the
interrelationship between transformations in property rights, the agrarian production proc-
ess, agrarian accumulation, dynamic productive efficiency, and rural politics. Using these
‘parameters of transition’, this article has demonstrated the radical restructuring of rural
relations of production that occurred in Vietnam during the 1980s and 1990s and has dem-
onstrated the impressive supply response that followed. It has indicated that asset differen-
tiation in rural Vietnam has been proceeding, and that along with such differentiation has
emerged differences in the technical coefficients of production witnessed amongst farms.
There has been a bifurcation in the Vietnamese countryside, between a small emergent
class of rich peasants that own more land and use more capital intensive production meth-
ods, and the majority small peasants, that own small amounts of land and use more labour
intensive production methods. These changes have not only unleashed agrarian production.
They have also, not surprisingly, led to the growth of differences in productivity, with rich
peasants being apparently more productive per unit of land than small peasants. It was
moreover demonstrated that rich peasants are more likely to be more deeply integrated into
market relations than small peasants, and thus while the shift to generalized commodity
production remains incomplete it is ongoing. The apparent hardening of the role of the law
of value in rural resource allocation, production and distribution suggests that an agrarian
transition, in the sense already defined, has started in Vietnam. Finally, the possible cu-
mulative impact of the agrarian transition on rural politics was discussed.
In Vietnam, the World Bank, the state, and the CPV have all stressed the need to
diversify agricultural production and develop rural non-farm employment (World Bank,
1998). As stated by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations
Development Programme (2000: 12), ‘Vietnam needs to adopt the seemingly paradoxical51
stance of giving a high priority to raising agricultural productivity while recognizing that
success can come only as agriculture declines as an employer of labor’. The findings of
this article suggest that this enthusiasm for rural diversification should be considered
within the context of the processes underpinning rural restructuring. A process of agrarian
transition is underway in Vietnam, and processes of peasant class differentiation are taking
place. The enthusiasm for diversification suggests that the World Bank, the state, and in-
deed the CPV support those rural households that they believe are most capable of foster-
ing a further supply response in agriculture, and that those households are rich peasants. A
strategy that focuses upon the rich peasants is not however without risks. While it may be a
rhetorical flourish to claim that ‘landlords are taking back the land’
5, there is ample evi-
dence to suggest that with processes of peasant class differentiation come increasing lan-
dlessness, proletarianization and inequality for the small peasants that make up the vast
bulk of the rural Vietnamese population. There is also ample evidence to suggest that those
who believe that they have lost out in the process of agrarian transition will not simply re-
main quiet, but will instead actively resist their marginalization. Given that rural politics is
both shaped by and shapes rural production and accumulation, there is still ample scope for
rural politics to reconfigure the parameters of Vietnam’s agrarian transition. In this sense,
then, the outcome of that transition remains unclear.
5. REFERENCES
Akram-Lodhi, A.H. (1998) ‘The agrarian question, past and present’ in Journal of Peasant
Studies vol 25 no 4.
Akram-Lodhi, A.H. (2000a) ‘The agrarian question and the “new” capitalism’ in Toporow-
ski, J (ed) Political Economy and the New Capitalism: Essays in Honour of Sam Aaro-
novitch, London: Routledge.
Akram-Lodhi A.H. (2000b) ‘A bitter pill? Peasants and sugarcane markets in northern
Pakistan’ in European Journal of Development Research vol 12 no 1 pp 206-228.
Akram-Lodhi, A.H. (2001a) ‘Binh Phuoc field notes’, haroon@iss.nl.
Akram-Lodhi, A.H. (2001b) ‘An Giang field notes’, haroon@iss.nl.
                                                
5 A comment from a former soldier in Bac Thai province, worried about the impact of growing concentration
of land, quoted in Kerkvliet (1995): 73.52
Akram-Lodhi, A. H. (2001c) ‘Vietnam’s agriculture: is there an inverse relationship?’ in
Institute of Social Studies Working Paper Series no 348.
Alan, S. (1990) Women in Vietnam, Stockholm: Swedish International Development
Agency.
ANZDEC (2000) ‘Viet Nam Agricultural Sector Program (ADB TA 3223-VIE): Phase I
Technical Report’, http://www.ifpri.org.
Van Arkadie, B. (1993) ‘Mapping the renewal process: the case of Vietnam’ in Public Ad-
ministration and Development vol 13 pp 433-451.
Bao, N. H., Haughton, J. and Quan, N. T. (forthcoming) ‘Tax incidence in Vietnam’,
mimeo.
Beresford, M. (1985) ‘Household and collective in Vietnamese agriculture’ in Journal of
Contemporary Asia vol 15 no 1 pp 5-35.
Beresford, M. (1990) ‘Vietnam: socialist agriculture in transition’ in Journal of Contempo-
rary Asia vol 20 no 4 pp 466-485.
Bernstein, H. (1996) ‘The political economy of the maize filière,’ in H. Bernstein (ed) The
Agrarian Question in South Africa, London: Frank Cass.
Brenner, R. (1977) ‘The origins of capitalist development’ in New Left Review no 104 1977.
Brenner, R. (1986) ‘The social basis of economic development’ in Roemer, J. (ed)
Analytical Marxism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Byres, T.J. (1996) Capitalism from Above and Capitalism from Below: An Essay in Com-
parative Political Economy, London: The MacMillian Press.
Byres, T.J. (1991) ‘The agrarian question and differing forms of capitalist agrarian transition:
an essay with reference to Asia’ in J. Breman and S. Mundle (eds) Rural Transformation
in Asia, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Cornia, G.A., Jolly, R. and Stewart, F. (1987) Adjustment with a Human Face, volume 1:
Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dacy, D. (1986) Foreign Aid, War and Economic Development: South Vietnam, 1955-
1975, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Desai, J. (2000) Vietnam Through the Lens of Gender: Five Years Later. Hanoi: Food and
Agriculture Organization.53
Dollar, D. and Litvack, J. (1998) ‘Macroeconomic reform and poverty reduction in Viet-
nam’ in Dollar, D., Glewwe, P. and Litvack, J. (eds) Household Welfare and Vietnam’s
Transition, Washington: The World Bank.
Van Donge, J.K., White, H. and Nghia, L.X. (1999) Fostering High Growth in a Low In-
come Country: Programme Aid to Vietnam, Stockholm: Swedish International Devel-
opment Agency.
The Economist (various issues).
Far Eastern Economic Review (various issues).
Fforde, A. (1989) The Agrarian Question in North Vietnam 1974-79: A Study of Coopera-
tor Resistance to State Policy, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Fforde, A. and Porter, D. (1994) ‘Public goods, the state and civil society and development
assistance in Vietnam’, paper presented to the Doi Moi, the State and Civil Society
Conference, Canberra, Australia, 10-11 November.
Fforde, A. and Sénèque, S. (1995) ‘The economy and the countryside’ in Kerkvliet, B.J.T.
and Porter, D.J. (eds) Vietnam’s Rural Transformation, Boulder: Westview Press.
Fforde, A. and de Vylder, S. (1989) Vietnam: An Economy in Transition, Stockholm:
Swedish International Development Agency.
Fforde, A. and de Vylder, S. (1996) From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in
Vietnam, Boulder: Westview Press.
Food and Agriculture Organization (1999) ‘FAOSTAT Agriculture Database’,
http://apps.fao.org, accessed 12 October.
General Statistical Office (GSO) (1999) Vietnam Living Standards Survey 1997-98, Hanoi:
General Statistical Office.
General Statistical Office (GSO) (1994) Vietnam Living Standards Survey 1992-93, Hanoi:
General Statistical Office.
Government of Vietnam-Donor-NGO Poverty Working Group (PWG) (1999) Vietnam:
Attacking Poverty, Hanoi: The World Bank.
Government of Vietnam-Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure Review (PER)
(2000a) Vietnam: Managing Public Resources Better--Public Expenditure Review 2000,
Volume 2, Hanoi: Vietnam Development Information Center.54
Government of Vietnam-Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure Review (PER)
(2000b)  Vietnam: Managing Public Resources Better--Public Expenditure Review
2000, Volume 1, Hanoi: Vietnam Development Information Center.
Hilton, R (1990) Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism (Revised edition), London:
Verso.
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (1996) Rice Market Monitoring and
Policy Options Study: Final Report, Washington: IFPRI.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2000) ‘Transition economies: an IMF perspective on
progress and prospects’, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/110300.htm, ac-
cessed on 16 May 2001.
Jansen, K. (1998) ‘Agrarian transition and growth in Vietnam’, paper delivered to the De-
velopment Economics Seminar, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 18 September.
Kerkvliet, B.J.T. (1995) ‘Rural society and state relations’ in Kerkvliet, B.J.T. and Porter,
D.J.  (eds) Vietnam’s Rural Transformation, Boulder: Westview Press.
Khiem, N.T. (1996) ‘Policy reform and the microeconomic environment in the agricultural
sector’ in Leung, S. (ed) Vietnam Assessment: Creating a Sound Investment Climate,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Langguth, A. J. (2000) Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schus-
ter.
Lavigne, M. (1999) The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market
Economy (Second edition), London: MacMillan Press.
Lenin, V. I. (1968) The Development of Capitalism in Russia, London: Lawrence and Wis-
hart.
Marx, K. (1998) Preface to a Critique of Political Economy, Cambridge: ElecBook.
Mellor, J. (1993) An Agriculture-Led Strategy for the Economic Transformation of Viet-
nam, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
Men, N.T. (1995) ‘Vietnamese agriculture in a centrally planned economy and in the tran-
sition to a market economy’ in Institute of Social Studies Working Papers no 197.
Mukherjee, C., White, H. and Wuyts, M. (1998) Econometrics and Data Analysis for De-
veloping Countries, London: Routledge.
Oxfam (GB) (1999) Tra Vinh: A Participatory Poverty Assessment, Hanoi: Oxfam (GB).55
Phong, D. (1995) ‘Aspects of agricultural economy and rural life in 1993’ in Kerkvliet,
B.J.T. and Porter, D.J. (eds) Vietnam’s Rural Transformation, Boulder: Westview Press.
Que, T.T. (1998) Vietnam’s Agriculture: The Challenges and Achievements, Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Rigby, T.H. (1991) ‘Mono-organizational socialism and the civil society’ in Kukathas, C.,
Lovell, D.W. and Maley, W. (eds) The Transition From Socialism: State and Civil So-
ciety in the USSR, Melbourne: Longman Chesire.
Sawyer, M. (1993) ‘The nature and role of the market,’ in C. Pitelis (ed) Transactions Costs,
Markets and Hierarchies, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Scott, J. (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press.
Spoor, M. and Visser, O. (2001) ‘The state of agrarian reform in the Former Soviet Union’
in Institute of Social Studies Working Papers no. 333.
Tarp, F. (1993) Stabilization and Structural Adjustment, London: Routledge.
Taylor, L. (1991) Varieties of Stabilization Experience, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Taylor, L. (ed) (1993) The Rocky Road to Reform: Adjustment, Income Distribution and
Growth in the Developing World, London: The MIT Press.
Tuan, D. T. (1997) ‘The agrarian transition in Vietnam: institutional change, privatization
and liberalization’ in Spoor, M (ed) The ‘Market Panacea’: Agrarian Transformation in
Developing Countries and Former Socialist Economies, London: Intermediate Tech-
nology Press.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (1989) Statistics and Policies: ECA
Preliminary Observations on the World Bank Report, Addis Ababa: Economic Com-
mission for Africa.
Vietnam Economic Times (various issues).
Vietnam Investment Review (various issues).
Vietnam News (various issues).
Watts, M. (1998) ‘Recombinant capitalism: state, de-collectivisation and the agrarian
question in Vietnam’ in Pickles, J. and Smith, A. (eds) Theorising Transition: The Po-
litical Economy of Post-Communist Transformations, London: Routledge.56
Wiens, T. (1998) ‘Agriculture and rural poverty in Vietnam’ in Dollar, D., Glewwe, P. and
Litvack, J. (eds) Household Welfare and Vietnam’s Transition, Washington: The World
Bank.
World Bank (1996) From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
World Bank (1998) Vietnam: Advancing Rural Development from Vision to Action, docu-
ment for the Consultative Group Meeting, Haiphong, December 7-8.
World Bank (2000a) World Development Indicators 2000, Washington: The World Bank.
World Bank (2000b) ‘Vietnam: Preparing for take-off? Table 7.1: agricultural production’
http://www.worldbank.org.vn/rep6/tab7_1.htm, accessed on 15 November.
World Bank (2000c) ‘Vietnam: Preparing for take-off? Table 3.2: merchandise exports by
commodity’ http://www.worldbank.org.vn/rep6/tab3_2.htm, accessed on 15 November.
World Bank/Asian Development Bank/United Nations Development Programme (2000)
‘Vietnam 2010: Entering the 21
st century, overview’, Hanoi: Vietnam Development In-
formation Center.57
6. FIGURES AND TABLES
Source: author’s calculations from Food and Agriculture Organization, 1999
6.
                                                
6. Production data obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s web site for the pre-1975 period is
for both the northern and the southern halves of Vietnam. This data appears to be the only available consis-
tent agricultural data set for the entire of Vietnam from the early 1960s to the present.
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Source: author’s calculations from Food and Agriculture Organization, 1999.






















Figure 4: Growth rates in foodgrain production, 1962-1997
















Source: World Bank (2000a).





















Agricultural value added per worker Agricultural value added per hectare62
Source: GSO, 1999.
Table 1:














310-400 2261 2685 565 408
401-500 2009 2179 511 86
Above 500 1803 2055 466 73
Source: adapted from Que, 1998: Table 3.2
Table 2:
Landholdings for all households with agricultural land in square metres, by expenditure quintiles,
1998
Area of landholdings
Expenditure quintiles All land Annual crop land Perennial crop land
I (poorest) 6437 3600 613
II 6953 3928 845
III 7138 4625 1016
IV 6928 4414 1485
V (richest) 9856 5081 3527
Note: Landholding includes land rented-out but excludes land rented-in
Source: PWG, 1999: Table 2.5.
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Public
investment as












a % of agri-
cultural GDP
1992 Not available 0.77 Not available 4.13 2.30
1993 Not available 0.63 Not available 3.14 2.16
1994 Not available 0.98 Not available 4.60 3.47
1995 5.5 1.27 22.84 5.73 4.46
1996 6.3 Not available 26.52 Not available Not available
1997 6.7 0.88 29.12 3.79 3.36
1998 7.1 0.99 32.64 4.79 3.73
Source: interpolated from PER (2000b): Table 1.1 and 3.2
Table 4:
Key indicators of production inputs
Input 1979-1981 1995-1997
Arable land per capita, in
hectares
0.11 0.07
Land under cereal production,
in thousands of hectares (*)
5963 7799
Irrigated land as a share of
cropland
24.1 31.0
Fertilizer use per hectare of
arable land, in hundreds of
grams
302 2566
Tractors per 100 hectares of
arable land
38 178
Note: (*) is for 1996-1998.
Source: World Bank, 2000a: Table 3.2.64
Table 5:
Crop cultivation expenses by expenditure quintile, 1993 and 1998

















I 34.45 44.31 0.28 6.60 0.19 7.09 5.07 2.03
II 27.11 47.89 0.48 7.92 0.30 6.31 6.02 3.97
III 24.58 47.64 0.74 8.63 0.46 5.34 7.24 5.38
IV 23.62 45.03 0.84 9.42 0.58 4.02 6.89 9.60





I 23.07 45.85 0.30 8.53 0.52 8.75 10.24 2.74
II 19.59 42.40 0.32 10.03 0.63 10.45 11.62 4.96
III 18.16 40.72 0.93 9.88 0.71 10.99 11.97 6.63
IV 15.85 36.55 3.26 9.30 0.76 12.49 12.49 9.30
V 10.73 22.25 0.87 6.41 0.69 11.94 36.65 10.47
Source: GSO, 1994: Table 5.2.10; GSO, 1999: Table 5.2.10.
Table 6:
Accounting for agricultural growth, 1976-1995










1976-80 2.03 1.57 0.74 -1.36 0.09 1.16 -0.17
1980-84 6.57 0.32 0.92 3.31 0.38 0.54 1.11
1984-88 2.40 0.51 0.66 0.15 0.44 -0.75 1.38
1988-95 5.03 0.97 0.65 0.97 0.22 2.18 0.02
Source: Jansen (1998): Table 2.
Table 7:
Paddy productivity by expenditure quintiles
Total output, 00s of kilos per hectare
Expenditure quintiles 1993 1998




V (richest) 31.24 41.1







Value as a share
of merchandise
exports (%)
1990 1455 187 272 15.7
1991 989 228 225 11.0
1992 1860 161 300 12.1
1993 1725 210 363 12.2
1994 1950 220 429 10.6
1995 (revised) 2052 268 549 10.6
1996 (revised) 3003 285 855 11.7
1997 (revised) 3553 245 870 9.5
1998 (prelimi-
nary)
3749 273 1024 10.9
Source: World Bank, 2000c.
Table 9:
Gini coefficients for Vietnam, 1978-2000
1978 1981 1984 1990 1993 1998 2000







Source: Tuan, 1997: Table 5.5; Dollar and Litvack, 1998; PWG, 1999.
Appendix Table A1:
The agricultural reform process, 1979-1998
Policy measures Objectives Main features Impacts
The 1979 sixth Party
plenum on ‘some urgent
problems in improve-
ment of economic man-
agement’
To encourage all co-
operatives to fully utilise
available resources to








2.  Widening the auton-
omy of co-operatives














Directive 100 of 1981
on ‘Output contracts to
labour groups and indi-
viduals’
To provide more eco-
nomic incentives to
farmers so that the effi-
ciency of resource use
improved, output would
grow, and the 1980 food
crisis would not be re-
peated.
The co-operative con-
tracted out land to house-
holds against an output
quota to be returned back.
The co-operative retained
overall control of the pro-
duction process. Income
distribution shifted from a





and dispose of output
in excess of the
quota. Famers’ in-
come improved in
both cash and kind.66
The 1983 Agricultural
Tax Ordinance
To unify and rationalise
the tax base across the
country, to encourage
farmers to utilise fallow
land, and to expand




from a focus on output and
area to a focus on quality,
area and average yield. The
tax was in paddy, and the
rate was fixed at 10 % of
average output for 5 years.
Reclaimed land was not
subject to tax for 3 to 5
years.
The total sown area
increased. Fallow
land was brought
back into use, and
land was reclaimed
for annual and peren-
nial crops.
The 1986 doi moi (reno-
vation) programme
To transform a centrally
planned economy into a
state-regulated market




The state officially recog-
nized the co-existence of
five economic sectors:
state, state capitalist, capi-
talist, co-operative and
private. The leading role of
the state sector, and the
regulatory role of the state,
was emphasized.
Agriculture slowed




The 1987 partial liber-
alization of food trade
To create a national
food market capable of
meeting planned food
consumption targets by
smoothing the flow of
food across the country,
subject to state control.
The abolition of the policy
of district level food self-
sufficiency in place since
the late 1970s. State com-
panies retained their mo-












Resolution 10 of 1988
on ‘Renewal of eco-
nomic management in
agriculture’ and Resolu-
tion 6 of 1989 on the
farm household
To overcome the food
crisis of 1987 and early
1988, the management
and production of agri-
culture was to be radi-
cally reorganized to
encourage rapid growth
by transforming the ex-
isting structure into a
diversified, commodity-
based agriculture.
The farm household for-
mally became the basic
economic unit in the rural
economy, with co-
operatives acting to sup-
port farm households. Co-
operatives contracted out
land to farm households for
15 years for annual crops,
and 40 years for perennial
crops. Capital stock and
working capital were
rented or bought by farm
households from co-
operatives. Farmers had to
pay agricultural taxes and
irrigation fees to the gov-
ernment. Output quotas are
retained, but eased, allow-
ing farm households to
keep a minimum of 40 per
cent of average output. The
quota was fixed for 5
years. Private food mar-












The trade and price lib-
eralization of 1989
To end the subsidy re-
gime used in the econ-
omy, and thus further
spur the growth of the
market.
Most macro- and micro-
economic prices were lib-
eralized, albeit to a differ-
ing extent. The quota pro-
curement system was
ended. Price controls were
ended. The exchange rate
was devalued. Positive real
interest rates were intro-
duced. Internal trade was
liberalized. The private
sector was allowed entry
into a wider range of busi-
ness activities, except
strategic sectors. The pri-
vate sector was allowed
entry into international
trade, except in strategic
goods such as rice and fer-
tilizer.
Agriculture grew
rapidly, and in par-
ticular rice produc-
tion, transforming
Vietnam from being a
net rice importer into
being the third largest






The rural financial re-
forms of 1990 to 1995,
and in particular the
authorization of lending
to rural households in
1993.
The Vietnam Bank for
Agriculture and Rural
Development (VBARD)
was established in 1990
to meet the growing
credit needs of farmers,
traders and agribusiness.
The People’s Credit
Funds (PCFs) were es-
tablished between 1993
and 1995 to mobilize
idle savings by provid-
ing local access to sav-
ings institutions, and to




The Vietnam Bank for
the Poor (VBP) was




The VBARD took over the
State Bank of Vietnam’s
(SBV) rural network of
branches and expanded it.
Acquiring credit from the
VBARD required collat-
eral, and land use certifi-
cates were the most com-
monly accepted form of
collateral. Mass organiza-
tions were widely used to
distribute credit and collect




and seek to recover the
costs of their operation.
The VBP is a non-profit
bank that operates through
the VBARD network but
which receives support




in total credit rose
from 10 % in 1991 to
82 % in 1995. In-
creasing numbers of
farms got access to
credit, allowing them





This speeded up the
commercialisation of
agriculture in both the
domestic and interna-
tional arenas. The
PCFs and VBP allow
many to escape from
poverty.
The 1993 Land Law and
the 1993 land use tax
ordinance
To provide farm house-
holds with more rights
over contracted land,
and in particular to se-
cure long-term tenurial
arrangements, in order
to improve the alloca-
tion and utilization of
land, encourage invest-
ment, and increase the
reclamation of land.
Land tenure was extended
to 20 years for annual
crops and 50 years for per-
ennial crops. Farm house-
holds could exchange,
transfer, lease, inherit and
mortgage land use rights.
Households were limited to
3 hectares per farm for
annual crops. Agricultural
land use tax was reduced
The total sown area
increased, especially
for perennial, indus-







from an average of 10 % of
yearly output to 7 % of
yearly output. Perennial
crops farmed on newly
reclaimed land were ex-
empted from tax.
The Price Stabilization




of sharp price fluctua-
tions.
Exporters and importers
were subjected to an excess
profit tax. The government
used these revenues to sub-
sidize credit for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs)
so that they would continue
to procure when farm gate
prices fell and transport
inputs and outputs to re-




to the SOEs were
complex. Moreover,
those SOEs that re-
ceived resources were
not those that bought
and sold agricultural
inputs and outputs to
and from farmers.
Thus, the results were
poor.
Decision 250 of 1998 To allow private com-
panies to export rice
A proportion of the rice
export quota was to be




dominant in rice ex-
ports.
Resolution 6 of 1998 on
the farm economy and
the 1998 Land Law
To recognize the posi-
tion of farm households
operating holdings in
excess of the legal 3-
hectare maximum by
legalizing the role of
land accumulation and
larger scale farms in the
agricultural sector.
The operation of the land
market was further clari-
fied, with provisions re-
garding the leasing, trans-
fer, and accumulation of
land in excess of 3-hectare
ceilings. Legal restrictions
on the hiring of labour
were to be removed, with
negotiable salaries between
employers and employees.
Income tax rates for large-
scale farms were to be cut
from 30 % to 5 %.
Too soon to say.
The agricultural trade
liberalization of 2001
To end the rice export
quota and the fertilizer
import quota
All firms were to be al-
lowed to export rice and
import fertilizer.
Too soon to say.
Source: adapted from van Donge, Whie and Nghia, 1999; Vietnam Investment Review (various issues).